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Abs t rac t  
  
This thesis explores whether sustainable peace can be achieved in post-conflict 
societies using the transitional justice approach. In particular, the truth commission 
is investigated as a mechanism of transitional justice. The South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was selected as a case study to investigate the 
relationship between sustainable peace and transitional justice. This thesis 
analyses whether the TRC Commission followed its mandate, and whether there 
are any specific definitions, conclusions or recommendations that the TRC through 
its Final Report undertakes in order to fulfill a specific part of the mandate, namely 
“to ensure that there would be no repetition of the past” (TRC vol. 5, chap. 8, 
paragraph 14). This is done through a textual analysis of the Final Report of the 
South African TRC, where inherent weaknesses of the Final Report in its aim of 
achieving sustainable peace are read critically and deconstructively. It is further 
analysed through linking the issue of sustainable peace to the field of transitional 
justice and the study of political development on how future TRCs can deal with 
the issue of sustainable peace. 
This thesis comes to the conclusion that the South African TRC failed to contribute 
to a significant analysis of how to prevent the repetition of the past. It is argued 
that this is based on a lack of a coherent theoretical framework, as the Final 
Report mixes two different truth finding mechanisms: micro-truth finding and 
macro-truth finding, together with the just war theory. By analysing the TRC’s 
theoretical framework through textual analysis, it becomes clear that micro- and 
macro-truth finding is difficult to combine in one report, and that in the South 
African case the micro-truth finding part is prioritised. However, the macro-truth 
finding mechanism would have provided a more in depth analysis towards 
sustainable peace – which in this thesis is read as Galtung’s positive peace and 
Lederach’s structural peace – and is a necessary prerequisite in order to achieve 
sustainable peace. Also the use of a traditional reading of the just war theory 
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contributes to an individualisation of the truth finding process and does not 
sufficiently support the macro-truths. Finally, by deconstructing the term never 
again it is shown that this approach should not be used in the TRCs or in the wider 
field of transitional justice.  
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Opsomming  
  
Hierdie tesis ondersoek of volhoubare vrede in postkonfliksamelewings met 
behulp van die oorgangsgeregtigheidsbenadering bereik kan word. Meer bepaald 
word die soeklig gewerp op die waarheidskommissie as meganisme van 
oorgangsgeregtigheid. Die Suid-Afrikaanse Waarheids-en-Versoeningskommissie 
(WVK) dien as gevallestudie om die verwantskap tussen volhoubare vrede en 
oorgangsgeregtigheid te bestudeer. Die tesis probeer vasstel of die WVK sy 
mandaat uitgevoer het, en of die Kommissie se finale verslag enige bepaalde 
omskrywings, gevolgtrekkings of aanbevelings bevat “om te verseker dat die 
verlede hom nie herhaal nie” (paragraaf 14, hoofstuk 8, volume 5 van die WVK-
verslag). Dít vind plaas deur middel van ! tekstuele ontleding van die finale WVK-
verslag wat die inherente swakpunte van dié dokument in sy strewe na volhoubare 
vrede krities en dekonstruktief benader. Die verslag word voorts ontleed deur die 
kwessie van volhoubare vrede te verbind met die gebied van oorgangs-
geregtigheid sowel as ontwikkelingstudies oor hoe toekomstige WVK’s die 
kwessie van volhoubare vrede kan hanteer. 
Die tesis kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat die Suid-Afrikaanse WVK nie ! bydrae 
gelewer het tot ! sinvolle ontleding van presies hoe om ! herhaling van die 
verlede te voorkom nie. Daar word aangevoer dat dít te wyte is aan die gebrek 
aan ! samehangende teoretiese raamwerk, aangesien die finale verslag twee 
verskillende waarheidsoekende meganismes vermeng – die mikrowaarheidsoeke 
en die makrowaarheidsoeke – en ook van die geregverdigde-oorlog-teorie gebruik 
maak. Deur die tekstuele ontleding van die teoretiese raamwerk van die WVK-
verslag word dit duidelik dat ! mikro- en makrowaarheidsoeke moeilik in een 
verslag te kombineer is, en dat, in die Suid-Afrikaanse geval, die mikro-
waarheidsoeke voorkeur geniet. Tog sou die makrowaarheidsoeke ! grondiger 
ontleding bied vir die suksesvolle verwesenliking van volhoubare vrede, wat in 
hierdie tesis as Galtung se ‘positiewe vrede’ en Lederach se ‘strukturele vrede’ 
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verstaan word. Trouens, die makrowaarheidsoeke is ! voorvereiste om 
volhoubare vrede te bereik. ! Tradisionele lesing van die geregverdigde-oorlog-
teorie dra ook by tot ! individualisering van die waarheidsoekende proses, en bied 
nie voldoende ondersteuning vir die makrowaarhede nie. Laastens word daar deur 
die dekonstruksie van die uitdrukking nooit weer nie getoon dat hierdie benadering 
nie in WVK’s of op die groter gebied van oorgangsgeregtigheid tuishoort nie.  
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C h a p t e r  O n e :  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
  
1 . 1  G e n e r a l  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
In the age of human rights interventions, transitional justice has become a 
buzzword and means for post-conflict societies of how to deal with a violent past. 
Where until the 1990s transitional justice measures were almost unheard of, with 
the exception of Argentina1, which has been one of the forerunners in this field, it 
is now common for governments, human rights groups and international 
negotiators to ask for a transitional justice process in the aftermath of violent 
conflicts. Naomi Roht-Arriaza defines transitional justice as “that set of practices, 
mechanisms, and concerns that are aimed at confronting and dealing with the 
legacies of past violations of human rights and humanitarian law” (as cited in Van 
der Merwe, Baxter & Chapman, 2009: vii). The origins of transitional justice can be 
linked to the acts perpetrated during the Holocaust, with crimes so heinous that 
they were defined as ‘against humanity’; genocide, mass murder and systemic 
torture, and atrocious acts of warfare and terror. These atrocities demanded to call 
to justice those commanders, organisers and abettors of these crimes. The 
Nuremberg2 legacy gave way to the establishment of international institutions of 
justice with power to end impunity (Robertson, 2006: ix), with the adoption of the 
Rome statute in 1998 and with this the creation of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) as its foremost example. 
Another and usually less legally binding transitional justice mechanism is the truth 
commission, which seeks to deal with the legacy of systemic abuses, but with a 
more victim-centred basis. Its mandate usually contains first and foremost “the 
establishing of an authoritative record of the past in order to overcome communal 
                                            
1 The Argentinean TRC or as it was called: the National Commission on the Disappeared 
(CONADEP) was active in 1984, right after the country’s return to civilian rule in 1983. 
2  The trial of the Nazi leaders in Nuremburg commenced in 1943 and changed the development of 
international law. Its charter defined crimes against humanity, and its procedures followed 
acceptable and credible evidence, a choice taken by the Allies.   
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and official denial of the atrocity, violence, or abuses and to get official and public 
acknowledgement” (Van der Merwe et al., 2009: 3). However, the mandates vary 
widely from country to country and usually include a wide range of goals such as 
restoring dignity to victims, creating a collective memory and promoting 
reconciliation across social divisions, to name a few.  
Another of these goals is one that occurs in almost every truth commission: the 
goal that a truth commission should be able to contribute towards ending violence 
and human rights abuses and prevent them from happening again. The final report 
of the Argentinean Commission on the Disappeared was called ‘Nunca Mas’, 
which translates into ‘Never Again’. In the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission’s (TRC’s) mandate this essential goal was formulated in this way: 
“compiling a report … which contains recommendations of measures to prevent 
the future violations of human rights” (TRC, vol. 1, chap. 4, p. 55, paragraph 31d). 
It is this aspect of the South African TRC, which is the subject of this study. The 
following study will explore the various aspects of achieving sustainable peace in 
post-conflict societies. An in-depth study will be done of the South African TRC 
concerning its ability to achieve sustainable peace.  
1 . 2  B a c k g r o u n d  
When the African National Congress (ANC) and the National Party (NP) came to 
the negotiation table, they had to deal with a country that already had emerged 
into profound changes through the process of globalisation. New patterns of 
investment, trade, and financial flows had been introduced both locally and 
globally, and even though the ANC could have chosen to reverse the patterns of 
globalisation, it chose to reinterpret the original goals of implementing a socialist-
type economic and social system and thus to change their original political 
platform (Allen, 2006: 91). This is in brief the economic context into which the TRC 
was born. It occurred in a very classical setting of political compromise: the new 
regime was interested in justice and establishing the truth, at the same time as the 
regime was afraid to upset the old regime too much so as to endanger the young 
regime undergoing transition - which was seen as a realistic threat. “Old generals 
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were still in a position to threaten credibly to make violent reprisals for any 
prosecutions for war crimes or human rights abuses, and in fact, did so,” writes 
Allen (2006: 157). The TRC was a balancing act between victims’ needs for justice 
and the possibility of reprisals from the perpetrators if this justice indeed was 
pursued. Thus, Mamdani (2002: 33), beyond others, argues that the “Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa was the fruit of a political compromise 
whose terms both made possible the Commission and set the limits within which it 
would work”. The TRC was determined to address victims as well as perpetrators, 
not just one or the other. The interim constitution that paved way for the legislation 
of the TRC contained this double determination by subscribing to a conditional 
amnesty: forcing every perpetrator to apply individually for amnesty, while it also 
required every victim, who is so acknowledged, to restrain from prosecution of the 
perpetrator. The final report of the South African TRC was presented to then 
President Nelson Mandela on 29 October 1998.   
1 . 3  L i t e r a t u r e  S u r v e y  
Concerning the literature review of this specific study, we have to distinguish 
between the theoretical approaches in the fields of transitional justice, peace 
research and studies of political development on the one hand, and the specific 
case study of this thesis, which is the TRC of South Africa. This literature survey 
uses both primary and secondary sources to look at the theoretical framework, 
while also dealing specifically with literature about the TRC.  
With regards to the theoretical approach and in order to have a working tool for 
this study, it is important to establish how to define sustainable peace. In 
“Violence, Peace and Peace Research”, Galtung (1969) explains his highly 
acknowledged division of the definition of peace; namely the division into positive 
and negative peace. Negative peace would be defined as the absence of violence, 
while positive peace would take into account the presence of both structural and 
cultural forms of violence. This is because the absence of violence does not 
necessarily mean that a society is peaceful and that there is no conflict. Socio-
economic inequality, unequal gender relations, racism and political exclusion are 
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just some issues that have to be regarded when looking at achieving peace. 
Galtung’s research is located within the field of peace research, but has had great 
influence on the field of transitional justice. The divide between negative and 
positive peace refers to the fact that there is more to a society than being either at 
war or in peace. It refers to social justice mechanisms and how a society is built 
up. This theoretical approach is central in this study. 
According to Lederach (1997: 3), Peace Research and conflict studies began in 
the early part of the 21st century. In the 1970s and 1980s organisations such as 
the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) and the Stockholm Institute of Peace 
Research (SIRPRI) were established. One of their focuses was to build up a 
consistent databank or database of conflict in order to statistically assess data for 
descriptive and comparative purposes. Another new field of research emerged in 
the beginning of the late 1980s: the field of ‘transitional justice’. It has its origins in 
the response to events in Latin America and is closely linked to the human rights 
field. This field has been criticised for viewing transitions in one lens: “that of 
transition to democracy” (Arthur, 2009: 19). We will come back to this issue during 
the course of this study. 
This study will follow Lederach`s suggestion of an integrated and complex 
peacebuilding process, with special emphasis on the continuing maintenance of 
peace. Lederach (1997: 20) states that:  
peacebuilding is more than postaccord reconstruction. Here, 
peacebuilding is understood as a comprehensive concept that 
encompasses, generates and sustains the full array of processes, 
approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more 
sustainable, peaceful relationships. The term thus involves a wide 
range of activities and functions that both precede and follow formal 
peace accords. Metaphorically, peace is seen not merely as a stage in 
time or a condition. It is a dynamic social construct. Such a 
conceptualization requires a process of building, involving investment 
and materials, architectural design and coordination of labour, laying of 
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a foundation, and detailed finish work, as well as continuing 
maintenance.  
Both Galtung and Lederach are central in the field of peace research. Lederach 
(1997: 75) links sustainability, which he defines as concern to “create a proactive 
process that is capable of regenerating itself over time - a spiral of peace and 
development instead of a spiral of violence and destruction” to the field of political 
development as necessary for peace. This study focuses on political development 
as a specific task set forth by the field of development studies.  
To link peace research, political development and the study of transitional justice 
into one academic field of interest, this study looks at some of the central scholars 
in the field of transitional justice. Kritz (2002) gives an overview of the 
developments in transitional justice and through his work it is possible to place 
South Africa in this field of study. Teitel (1997) focuses on the important aspect of 
the role of law in the field of Transitional Justice. This discussion is vital for the 
accountability of the field of Transitional Justice. Laplante (2008: 1) focuses on the 
question “what more transitional justice can do to promote the aims of 
reconciliation and sustainable peace”. She suggests that truth commissions should 
expand their mandate and include socio-economic and cultural rights in order to 
sustain peace. The notion of socio-economic and cultural justice enjoys growing 
interest and is considered a pressing need by many scholars and practitioners 
within the transitional justice movement (Mani, 2008: 253).  
When it comes to political development, Huyse in Harris & Reilly’s “Democracy 
and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiatiors” indicates that part of 
peacebuilding is the different policies of coping with the past (Hyse in Harris et al., 
1998: 273). Huyse carefully analyses amnesty, truth commission, lustration, 
criminal prosecution and compensation. Habib & Bentley (2008) bring forth 
important research concerning citicenship, nationbuilding and democratization. 
They investigate into answering the following: “The single biggest question of the 
21st  century is how to build the bridges of solidarity that enable the emergence of 
a common citizenship and a cohesive human community” (Habib & Bentley., 2008: 
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xi), what they call “the national question” (ibid: 5). By raising this question they 
simmultaneously point out that the South African Constitution supports a non-
racial, cosmopolitan3 citizenship that might be undergoing severe change in the 
future since this can be observed as an international trend (ibid.: 9).   
In order to approach the specific case study of the South African TRC, we need to 
consider De Lange (2000) and Boraine (2000) who give an account of the origins 
of the South African TRC. A TRC is a political tool manifested in its mandate: the 
definition of how broad or narrow a mandate is set, who the commissioners are 
and by whom they are appointed, whether it allows or invites recommendations 
and how they are linked to the judicial system and its question of amnesty. These 
decisions are taken before the TRC starts its work. Very seldom is a mandate 
changed during the work of a TRC. In South Africa the mandate guided the work 
of the TRC throughout the whole process.  
Gibson (2004), Jeffrey (1999), Mamdani (2002), Simpson (2002), Stanley (2001), 
and Van der Merwe & Chapman (2008), beyond others, evaluate the South 
African TRC and give valuable criticism of what has been achieved and what could 
have been achieved. This study will refer to most of the authors mentioned above 
throughout the findings, but most specifically in chapter 4. Therefore it will just 
shortly list their findings here; Gibson (2004) analyses whether truth actually 
contributes to reconciliation in South Africa. He links the search for ‘the truth’ with 
the effort of creating a collective memory and concludes that some sort of 
reconciliation exists in South Africa today. However, he could not show that truth 
inevitably led to reconciliation – a finding that supports the recommendation not to 
use the never agains, as shown in this study. He furthermore links reconciliation to 
democratic reform and shows that “reconciliation both helps and hinders the 
practice of democratic politics” (ibid.: 151). Jeffrey (1999) is concerned with the 
findings of the TRC and the methods used to reach these. She concludes with the 
allegations that the commission was biased both in their compositon and their 
                                            
3 Habib et al. define cosmopolitanism through a three point definition: common humanitarianism 
combined with tolerance for difference and a belief in universalism. 
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findings. Mamdani (2002) focuses on the commissions’ individualization of guilt 
and the consequences this has for the final report of the TRC in its totality. Also 
Simpson (2002) points out that the choices how to specify the different categories 
of victims and perpetrators are political, and he criticises the Commission for 
unpredictability and arbitrariness when it comes to the decisions of the amnesty 
process. He goes as far as to state that “[i]ndeed, there is a real possibility that the 
TRC, by granting amnesty to confessed killers, may actually have contributed to 
the sense of impunity that fuels the burgeoning rate of violent crime” (Simpson, 
2002: 247). Stanley (2001) further contributes towards painting a picture of doubt 
whether the TRC can aid in “building a ‘reconciliatory bridge’” (ibid.: 525), since the 
government is reticent to provide for a climate of development and change. Finally, 
Van der Merwe et al. (2008) question explicitly whether truth commissions are 
“appropriate vehicles for promoting reconciliation and forgiveness, especially in a 
society with deep structural devisions” (ibid.: 277), Their findings show beyond 
others that there exists a lack of reconciliation on the basis of the work of the TRC 
in South Africa.  
The above mentioned authors have all established their research methods in how 
to reach their conclusions. Through their findings and choice of research methods, 
their research will give important input to the seeking of criteria for sustainable 
peace and to the answer to the question whether South Africa’s TRC has been 
successful in terms of achieving sustainable peace. In fact, their precision in using 
research methods has encouraged this study to seek similar precision in the work 
of the South African TRC. 
Accordingly, this study will rely heavily on the analysis of the Final Report of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. This reliance on this primary 
source is crucial in order to answer the question: what does it imply “to ensure that 
there would be no repetition of the past” (TRC vol. 5, chap. 8, 14)? It will be 
decisive for this study to analyse how the TRC itself has implemented the quest for 
sustainable peace. In order to do so, this study will be using the research method 
of textual analysis as outlined by Mouton (2001) and Balkin (1994). Section 1.6 
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provides a detailed description of texutual analysis; its criteria, and how it was 
executed.  
Finally, this study will lean towards secondary literature that can support this study 
with historical information on the political development of South Africa after the 
transition in 1994. These sources focus mainly on the history, and include: Allen 
(2006), Butler (2004), Dubow (2000), Marais (2001), Makgetla (2004), Muiu (2008) 
and Thornton (1998).  
1 . 4  R e s e a r c h  P r o b l e m  
Through a textual analysis of the Final Report of the South African TRC, this study 
has as its goal to analyse and discuss inherent weaknesses of the Final Report in 
its aim of achieving sustainable peace. The methods of analysis used by the TRC 
(a mixture of micro- and macro- truth findings in combination with a traditional 
reading of just war theory), had and still have consequences for how South 
Africans perceive themselves, which furthermore has an impact on sustainable 
peace, as for example shown by Gibson (2004) through his systematic evaluation 
of the truth and reconciliation process. Gibson (2004) evaluates in his study 
whether the truth has contributed to reconciliation in South Africa. He offers a 
systematic analysis of the correlation between truth and reconciliation and 
concludes that truth does not inevitably lead to reconciliation. This brings us to the 
question what the truth in the final report of the South African TRC has thus led to. 
Telling the truth has been equivalent to contributing to a more peaceful and 
democratic future. However, as has been shown by many scholars beyond others 
Simpson (2002), Stanley (2001), Van der Merwe et al. (2008) and Habib et al. 
(2008), the South African future4 cannot be called peaceful and democratic. 
According to Laplante (2008), there is a need for new research and new 
approaches to the field of transitional justice, especially when it comes to socio-
economic and cultural issues, which would in fact bring the field of transitional 
justice, the study of political development and the field of peace study closer to 
                                            
4 The future – from the perspective of the TRC – is now; to use a slogan from the World Economic 
Forum in Davos, Switzerland, 2007. 
 18
each other, since it addresses a wider political agenda then the quest for the 
guilty. There is moreover a need to discuss what the notion of sustainable peace 
implies; an issue like the time aspect in sustainable peace and in the TRC is a 
problematic issue which has to be discussed. Lederach (1997: 75) states that 
“while achieving a cease-fire is an immediate necessity, this goal must not be 
mistaken for, or replace, the broader framework of peacebuilding activity. Rather, 
a sustainable transformative approach suggests that the key lies in the relationship 
of the involved parties, with all that term encompasses at the psychological, 
spiritual, social, economic, political, and military levels.” Further, Lederach 
explains: “The process of peace building must rely on and operate within a 
framework and a time frame defined by sustainable transformation” (ibid.). 
Contrary to this, the TRC was a very time limited endeavour, inaugurated in 
December of 1996 with the Commission’s five-volume report released in October 
1998.    
Thus, from the analysis in this section, the main research problem to be 
investigated in the study is whether TRCs are useful in achieving sustainable 
peace in post-conflict societies. In order to do this, the study will focus on an 
evaluation of the South African TRC through a textual analysis of the Final Report. 
1 . 5  O b j e c t i v e s  a n d  R e l e v a n c e  o f  t h e  T h e s i s  
The purpose of this study is to evaluate how effective the South African TRC was 
in attaining sustainable peace. As a mechanism of transitional justice, was South 
Africa’s TRC able to achieve sustainable peace? To answer this question, the 
thesis analyses whether the TRC followed its mandate, and whether there are any 
specific definitions, conclusions or recommendations that the TRC undertakes in 
order to fulfill this specific part of the mandate, namely “to ensure that there would 
be no repetition of the past” (TRC vol. 5, chap. 8, paragraph 14). The study further 
asks the question, what more can transitional justice do to promote the aim of 
sustainable peace, in particular by redressing economic, social and cultural rights 
of its citizens? The thesis aims to give some recommendations concerning 
developing the work of the TRC in collaboration with the three different fields of 
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research addressed in this paper: peace research, studies of political development 
and transitional justice.  
This study is relevant in the field of transitional justice on different levels. On the 
one hand it will give a rigorous textual analysis of a central topic and by this 
enhance the critical voices already existing in the field of transitional justice. 
However, these critical voices need support, since the field without doubt is 
conservative in its praxis. There is the possibility of being regarded as over-
idealistic and that recommendations are too costly and difficult to implement, and 
thus not realistic and hence that they will not be considered of value to the field of 
transitional justice (Robertson, 2006: 313). There is furthermore the fear of being 
non-scientific and non-objective, which would enhance the impression that TRCs 
are not dealing with hard facts. The danger is that this negative reputation will in 
the long run destroy the goodwill this justice mechanism has built up. 
On the other hand, this thesis contributes towards the theoretical framework on 
sustainable peace as it seeks to compare and combine findings from three 
different theoretical areas of peace building, studies of political development and 
transitional justice. 
1 . 6  R e s e a r c h  D e s i g n  a n d  R e s e a r c h  M e t h o d s  
The research design of this study is a case study; the evaluation of South Africa’s 
TRC as an example of a transitional justice mechanism. It is a qualitative study 
using both primary and secondary data. The secondary data was retrieved from 
academic books and journals, and on the primary source side it looked at the 
material produced through the South African TRC, in particular the Final Report of 
the TRC. This study is micro in its scope, since it focuses on the South African 
TRC and on a very limited part of its mandate. However, it has theoretical 
ambitions as it tries to contribute towards the theoretical framework of transitional 
justice.  
Chapters Two and Three are based on secondary data, relying on extracting 
knowledge about theory and history out of already published and presented 
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material. Chapter Four is mainly based on a primary source; the analysis of the 
Final Report of the South African TRC. This makes this study explorative in its 
attempt to find new answers with innovative questions, descriptive in that it is 
eager to embed the findings into existing theory, and explanatory in its seeking of 
causalities (Babbie & Mouton, 2005: 81) between the different events and choices 
that the TRC made during its two years of existence. The unit of analysis is the 
South African TRC. The research instrument in this study is textual analysis. 
Textual analysis is chosen in order to understand a text, in this case the Final 
Report of the TRC on theoretical grounds. This is done through an inductive, or 
verstehende, mode of reasoning, while it is further expanded to “test, reject or 
validate existing analyses and interpretations” (Mouton, 2001: 167), as it is done 
by looking at secondary literature that has evaluated the South African TRC. This 
mode of reasoning would be deductive in nature. The text analysis is executed 
through a two step analysis: On the one hand it conducts a statistical analysis, 
through the simplest form of observing mathematical transformations: namely 
giving a frequency list of certain words the researcher believes to be important for 
this study. In the case of this study it focused on the never agains and the two 
related words “sustainable” and “sustainability”. The statistical analysis is 
thereafter linked with a content analysis, which is a qualitative analysis that 
comments on the context in which these words are used from a critical evaluative 
point of view. Finally, this textual analysis looks further to other authors and their 
literature on the TRC in order to strengthen its findings. Additionally this study 
engages with the analytical tool that is used in the South African TRC, namely the 
just war theory. It offers a discourse explanation analysis, since it rather than 
merely describing discourse structures, tries to explain them in terms of social 
structures. Thus the focus is on explaining and interpreting the different concepts 
that are used in the final report of the South African TRC.  
This study leans furthermore towards a deconstructive reading of the primary text. 
Deconstruction can here be understood as a “pursuit of justice [that] is 
neverending, … [but] form part of a critical theory of law and society” (Balkin, 
1994: 13). This understanding goes well together with the postmodern position in 
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constructivism which is adapted in this study and explained in the following 
section. 
1 . 6 . 1  T h e  p o s t m o d e r n  p o s i t i o n  i n  c o n s t r u c t i v i s m  
Social constructivism became a popular alternative in many social sciences and 
has also manifested itself in the field of transitional justice, the study of political 
development and peace research. While realists would predict anarchy in the 
international system, in the absence of a superior and centralized authority, they 
would conclude that international justice is not able to restore normality that is the 
rule of law and stability. Liberalism, on the other hand, would propagate human 
rights norms as consistent with key liberal values. Some constructivists, finally, 
would see justice after transition as part of a normative development. This 
development will change behavioural patterns over time and will by this be able to 
contribute to sustainable peace. Normative development would thus be to 
formulate laws, treaties and activities that point towards the unacceptability of 
severe violations of rights and the necessity of a punitive response.  
At this point it has to be clarified that constructivism is not one theory, but rather a 
set of theories. While one part of constructivism can be normative, other parts are 
not. Actually it would be more correct to call it the field constructivism-s, since 
there are numerous positions in the field of social constructivism. This makes 
constructivism much more of an approach than a fully-fledged theory, embracing a 
variety of perspectives that pursue quite different agendas. 
This study is guided by a postmodernist constructivist approach. Postmodernists 
deny the a priori understandings of the material world - as do the middle ground 
constructivists, but the postmodernists go one step further. Rather than accepting 
the predominant social construction of symbols, postmodernism engages in their 
deconstruction. Deconstruction exposes the hollowness of false claims. Reality 
cannot be understood outside of our contexts, that is, outside of human 
interpretations, and it is out of a need to free us from the burden of responsibility 
that the independent reality is constructed. “[T]he assertion of an independently 
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existing reality, which in itself cannot be proved and seems to demand no proof, 
works to support particular political positions and to exclude others from 
consideration” (Zehfuss, 2002: 245). Zehfuss reminds us of one thing explicitly, 
that agents do have agendas and that methodological choices are never innocent, 
but deeply political. For the purpose of this study, the postmodern position of 
constructivism is used to question and deconstruct the ideas, beliefs and attitudes 
scholars have developed towards the field of transitional justice and TRCs more 
specifically. Accordingly, this study is encouraged to be critical and engaging 
towards the subject of this study. As it will use textual analysis as a deconstructive 
practice, this study will rely on a postmodern constructivist reading of the South 
African TRC. 
1 . 7  L i m i t a t i o n s  a n d  D e l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  T h e s i s  
There were few limitations concerning the accessibility of the main sources, since 
these are readily available both on the Internet, through libraries and in the 
research environment I work in. However, there is one serious limitation in the fact, 
and as previously mentioned, that the field of research in which my study is part of 
is highly conservative. This influences my argumentations and analysis, since I will 
not be able to avoid self-censorship. A discussion of the subject of ‘Ethics of 
Research’ is given in Mouton (2001: 238), where objectivity and integrity of the 
research ranks high on the list of ethics. My constraints (or strengths as it also 
could be phrased) are that I come from a radical constructivist tradition, which 
differs from the generally accepted approach to transitional justice. I will make it 
clear that my aim is to redefine the impact of the concept of never again - as much 
as my findings will allow for it, and thereby guide future use of never again and its 
broader socio-political impact on justice. This study is guided by the general rules 
of research ethics. 
The time-span specifically of the case study in chapter four is from 1994 up to 
recent years of published material, as late as 2010. However, chapter two and 
three will go further back in time, so as to give as much and as relevant 
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information as possible, which is necessary to establish a good overview of the 
issue discussed.  
As mentioned earlier, this study will use the Final Report of the TRC and 
secondary data sources. Because of time constraints, no further primary data has 
been collected, even though this would clearly have been beneficial to this study. 
As the field of transitional justice is still very young, there is a lack of conceptual 
literature and furthermore there is a lack of empirical literature (Van der Merwe et 
al., 2009: 127). This study will contribute to both areas. 
1 . 8  O u t l i n e  o f  t h e  R e m a i n d e r  o f  t h e  T h e s i s  
This study contains five chapters aiming to give a thorough analysis of the issue 
discussed: achieving sustainable peace in post-conflict societies through an 
evaluation of the final report of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. Chapter two provides the theoretical framework of this study – 
pointing towards definitions and mechanisms of Transitional Justice, the study of 
political development and the field of peace research, as well as its history and 
theory. It discusses the field of peace research and the study of political 
development and its connotation to Transitional Justice, and conceptualises two 
key terms: the never agains and sustainable peace. Chapter three focuses on the 
historical background of the South African TRC. It introduces the reader to a short 
history of segregation and follows the segregation towards the Apartheid state. It 
gives a picture of ‘high Apartheid’ and the resistance against it and then shortly 
explains the negotiated settlement and more explicitly the role of the TRC in the 
negotiations. Thereafter it focuses on the TRC: its mandate, operationalisation, 
outcome and recommendations, before it introduces some of the Achilles heels of 
the TRC. 
Chapter four presents the textual analysis of the Final Report of the TRC. 
Additionally, it focuses on the choice of the just war theory taken by the 
Commission. Thereafter it analyses the never agains, the notion of sustainable 
peace and the depiction of institutional and structural violence in the Final Report. 
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Finally it looks at the recommendations given by the TRC before it gives space to 
several other researchers who have been evaluating the South African TRC. 
Chapter five is solely dedicated to give a summary of the findings and to present 
some of the conclusions reached through this study. Furthermore, it provides 
recommendations for future studies and outlines where this study came short. 
1 . 9  C o n c l u s i o n  
This first chapter had three goals. Firstly, to offer a general introduction into the 
study and to provide the reader with some background information. This first 
information given is further deepened and broadened throughout this thesis. For 
the second, it gives the technical outline of the study, its objectives and relevance, 
its methodology and research design and not least its limitations and delimitations. 
This is done according to both academic and ethical rules and should clarify for 
the reader how this study has been undertaken and which sources have been 
used. For the third, this first chapter is designed to make the aim of this research 
clear, namely to investigate into sustainable peace in post-conflict societies with 
the goal to give an evaluation of South Africa’s TRC. 
The following chapter investigates the theoretical perspective of the research 
study. It conceptualises sustainable peace in three different fields of study: peace 
research, political development and transitional justice. This is done for several 
reasons. First of all, because transitional justice is a very young field of study and 
leans towards previously established fields. On the other hand, it also had the urge 
to break away from these areas, and it is vital for this research to understand why 
transitional justice has established its own field of research rather than to join 
either the peace research area or the field of political development. Secondly, the 
in-depth analysis will be able to formulate similarities and differences in these 
three approaches. Finally, it will be able to subtract the key aspects of sustainable 
peace and the never agains and provide the study with the necessary tools to 
accomplish the research proposed. 
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C h a p t e r  T w o :  T h e o r e t i c a l  F r a m e w o r k  
  
2 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
The theoretical framework of this study borrows its foundation from different 
sources and different theoretical approaches. On the one hand, this study will 
explore the field of transitional justice and its neighboring fields: peace studies and 
the study of political development – always connected to the issue of sustainable 
peace. All three areas have developed differently, but seem to converge in recent 
years. This study investigates these fields by looking at the definitions used, but 
also through investigating the history and theory connected to the field of 
transitional justice. This is done in order to be able to predict the development of 
the field of transitional justice in the near future and to evaluate how effective the 
South African TRC was in attaining sustainable peace. 
On the other hand it is necessary to look into the two key terms: firstly, the concept 
of ‘never again’ and its theoretical implications. By this, the study touches upon 
Holocaust research and its connected study of Zionism combined with post-
colonialism in order to see the relevance of the phrase never again for this study, 
and concerning South Africa specifically. Secondly, the term ‘sustainable peace’ is 
discussed. Finally, a fusion of these approaches is given in the conclusion in order 
to clarify the theoretical framework of this study. 
2 . 2  D e f i n i t i o n s  a n d  M e c h a n i s m s  o f  T r a n s i t i o n a l  J u s t i c e  
The definition of transitional justice is dependent on which focus the researcher 
has, and on what mechanisms the researcher is looking at. Kritz gave a very 
general idea of transitional justice by stating his approach to the concept or area of 
transitional justice as more specifically looking at the transformation from minority 
rule to democracy, as is shown in the title of his four-volume compendium 
Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes 
from 1995. Piccone, as quoted in Arthur (2009: 12), repeats and transforms his 
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approach in stating that the area of transitional justice addresses “how new 
democracies have attempted to strike a balance between redressing the abuses of 
the former governments and integrating victims and perpetrators in a post-conflict 
society”. Both engage very uncritically with the democracy - transitional justice 
nexus5. 
Later on, Kritz (2009: 13) summarises four basic objectives of any transitional 
justice programme, rather than giving a definition of the term. His four objectives 
consist of:  
1. Determining of the truth by establishing a human rights abuse record.  
2. Justice.  
3. Meaningful democratic reform, entrenchment of the rule of law within 
society, and building a society with institutions that ensure that the kinds of 
abuses being dealt with will not recur.  
4. Durable peace.  
Backer (2009: 28), on the other hand, focuses rather on the approaches to 
transitional justice stating that to confine the discussion of transitional justice to a 
prosecution-pardon discourse is too limiting since the options in practice are more 
extensive. He includes in the transitional justice mechanisms the following six 
areas:  
1. Criminal prosecution by existing or ad hoc courts;  
2. Other formal sanctions, such as lustration, purges, and bannings of political 
parties;  
3. Reparations, which can be financial, material, or symbolic;  
4. Investigations conducted by truth commissions or independent inquiries;  
5. Institutional reform, including the establishment of formal human rights 
oversight (for example commission, ombudsman, public protector, special 
                                            
5 Please view the section 2.2.1 on transitional justice and section 2.2.2 on the study of political 
development for a discussion of this issue. 
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parliamentary committee), and the introduction, amendment, or restoration 
of a constitution, and  
6. Immunity through amnesties, pardons, and other limits on accountability 
and punishment.  
Van der Merwe et al. (2009) admit that there are no definite answers for how the 
need for justice, truth, reconciliation, and healing can be addressed, and they also 
suggest a list of transitional justice mechanisms rather than a definition. Their list 
emphasises that mechanisms used in different national contexts vary widely, 
including:  
! establishing an authoritative record of the past in order to overcome 
communal and official denial of the atrocity, violence, or abuses and to get 
official and public acknowledgment;  
! restoring dignity to victims and promoting psychological healing;  
! ending violence and human rights abuses and preventing them in the 
future;  
! creating a ‘collective memory’ or common history for a new future not 
determined by the past;  
! forging the basis for a democratic political order that respects and protects 
human rights;  
! identifying the architects of the past violence and excluding, shaming, and 
diminishing perpetrators for their offenses;  
! legitimating and promoting the stability of the new regime;  
! promoting reconciliation across social divisions;  
! educating the population about the past; and  
! recommending ways to deter future violations and atrocities. 
All of the above mentioned scholars promote democracy as one of the key 
elements for transitional justice. It goes beyond the task of this study to examine 
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whether the predispositon towards democratic rule is a necessity for transitonal 
justice. However, there are scholars who exclude the necessity of a democratic 
political order from their definition/list of transitional mechanisms. Roht-Arriaza 
(2009: vii) has given a comprehensive and open definition that does not limit 
transitional justice to democratic mechanisms and includes all attempts from 
prosecution to pardon. As quoted already in chapter 1, she defines transitional 
justice as “that set of practices, mechanisms, and concerns that are aimed at 
confronting and dealing with the legacies of past violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law.” This research will use Roht-Arriaza’s definition as a basis for its 
study. 
2 . 2 . 1  T r a n s i t i o n a l  J u s t i c e  –  H i s t o r y  a n d  T h e o r y  
According to Ruti Teitel (2003), the field of transitional justice has a three-phased  
historical evolution: while the origins of transitional justice can be traced back to 
World War I with its fragile beginnings, Teitel suggest to start her genealogy in 
1945, strongly connected to the Nuremberg tribunal, because first at this point in 
history it became “extraordinary and international” (Teitel, 2003: 70); the second 
phase Teitel traces to the late 20th century, with the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and with it the change of the power structure in the world, but more explicitly in 
Latin America and Eastern Europe. Teitel describes this as a “wave of democratic 
transitions and modernization that began in 1989” (Teitel, 2003: 70); and finally the 
contemporary phase where transitional justice moves from the exception to the 
norm, a “fin de siëcle acceleration of transitional justice phenomena associated 
with globalization and typified by conditions of heightened political instability and 
violence” (Teitel, 2003: 71). It is important to mention here that other scholars, like 
John Elster (2004), would treat transitional justice as a recurrent historical 
problem, from ancient Athens to the present, and not as a recent phenomenon, as 
Teitel suggests. 
However, Arthur traces the written origins of the term transitional justice to an 
“article about the Charter 77 Foundation’s 1992 conference in Salzburg, ‘Justice in 
Times of Transition’” (2009: 10) in the Boston Herald, while he states that Neil 
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Kritz’s four-volume compendium Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies 
Reckon with Former Regimes in 1995 cemented the use of ‘Transitional Justice’ 
rather than the former used term ‘Justice in Transition’. Arthur (2009: 19) 
questions the term transition and furthermore the use of the phrase transitional 
justice. He asks what would be the typology of ‘transition’ and answers: 
[P]erhaps some countries experienced ‘revolutions’ others ‘transfers of 
power,’ others ‘regime change,’ others ‘restorations,’ others 
‘independence,’ others ‘modernization,’ others ‘political development,’ 
and still others ‘transition’ of one sort or another: from capitalism to 
socialism, from military dictatorship to civilian rule, from 
authoritarianism to democracy, from communism to liberal democracy, 
from communism to a market economy, etc. The varieties of change 
are in fact quite staggering.   
Arthur questions furthermore why ‘transition to democracy’ came to be the 
dominant interpretation of change in the 1980s, while in the 1960s liberal Western 
policy makers would rather speak of “socioeconomic modernization as a 
precondition of an evolutionary process of political development” (Arthur, 2009: 
20)? He gives a four-point explanation: first of all, because countries in transition 
choose democracy over other possibilities. Secondly, because  modernisation 
theory lost its followers; thirdly, because the Marxist discourse of 
transformation/transition would be replaced by a more technocratic approach to 
engineering political change (from socioeconomic transformation to legal-
institutional reform); fourth and connected to the latter, the global decline of the 
radical ‘Left’ during the 1970s supported a change from ideology (class) to human 
rights. Carothers (2002: 9) shows, however, that the transition-democracy 
paradigm has not been successful:  
[o]f the nearly 100 countries considered as “transitional” in recent 
years, only a relatively small number – probably fewer than 20 – are 
clearly en route to become successful, well-functioning democracies or 
at least have made some democratic progress and still enjoy a positive 
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dynamic of democratization. The leaders of the group are found 
primarily in Central Europe and the Baltic region – Poland, Hungary, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Slovenia – though there are a few in 
South America and East Asia, notably Chile, Uruguay, and Taiwan. 
Those that have made somewhat less progress but appear to be still 
advancing include Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Mexico, Brazil, Ghana, 
the Philippines, and South Korea. 
When it comes to South Africa, two conferences were important in order to agree 
on an intellectual framework for transitional justice: the 1992 Charter 77 
Foundation conference and the 1994 Institute for a Democratic Alternative for 
South Africa (IDASA)-sponsored conference on dealing with the past. Here, two 
normative goals were expressed: “First, the goal of providing some measure of 
justice to those who suffered under repressive state regimes and second, the goal 
of facilitating an exit from authoritarianism and shoring up a fragile democracy” 
(Arthur, 2009: 41).  
In addition, South Africa clearly benefited from the experiences several countries 
had with transitional justice. Visits of South Africans to Latin American countries in 
particular, to gather comparative material, and the participation of international 
experts in the South African conferences brought about a deep transnational 
impact on the South African search for justice and reconciliation. Beyond these 
comparative exchanges, Kritz (2002: 24) points towards contemporary standards 
that were relevant to the transitional justice endeavours in South Africa: 
The protections guaranteed to criminal defendants enshrined in the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and elaborated in the 
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, have been 
supplemented by such UN standards as the Standard Minimum Rules 
for the Treatment of Prisoners (1957), the Basic Principles on the 
Independence of the Judiciary (1985); the Standard Minimum Rules for 
the Administration of Juvenile Justice (1985), the Basic Principles on 
the Role of Lawyers (1990); the Basic Principles for the Treatment of 
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Prisoners (1990); Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors (1990), and 
the Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Rules (1990). 
Kritz furthermore emphasises the importance of the United Nations (UN) Human 
Rights Commission and UN Human Rights Committee for developing international 
standards as well as the European Court and Commission on Human Rights, the 
Inter-American Court and Commission on Human Rights, the 1990 Copenhagen 
Document and 1991 Moscow Documents produced through the ‘Helsinki process’ 
as well as the work of UN rapporteurs, the writings of many legal scholars, and the 
work of human rights organisations. 
There is a trend towards trials (international, national and mixed), but there is 
equally a trend away from trials, focusing on a victim-centred approach. South 
Africa took the victim-centred approach by establishing its TRC and by introducing 
a new approach towards amnesty. It offered a conditional amnesty, where 
perpetrators would apply for amnesty on an individual basis and through full 
disclosure of their crimes and through collaboration with the TRC investigators 
(Kritz, 2002: 34). This issue is dealt with more thoroughly in chapter three. 
2 . 2 . 2  T h e  S t u d y  o f  p o l i t i c a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  
The theoretical approach of Transitional Justice is complemented by the theory of 
political development. Development studies have undergone major changes since 
the 1960s, and ‘development’ has become a buzzword in politics, as it is closely 
linked to the study of democracy. In the 1960s there was a widely acknowledged 
positive correlation between development and democracy. For two decades 
thereafter it was largely absent from academia, while after the end of the Cold 
War, it worked its way back into the academic and political spheres. Today, as 
Elgström & Hyden (2002: 191) state that the “positive, causal relationship between 
development and democracy is an accepted scientific finding”. Elgström et al. cite 
several references like Lerner (1958); Lipset (1959); Huntington (1991); Ingelhart 
(1997); Vanhanen (1997) and empirical studies like Doorenspleet (2001).  
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Many analysts, however, question the assumption that with the introduction of 
liberal democracy, all countries necessarily ‘stabilise’ and ‘develop’ (see Galtung; 
Good, 2002; Southall, 2003; Muiu, 2008). These scholars contend that liberal 
democracies reflect the narrow interests of elites and the supremacy of the 
constitution and the notion of democracy represented by Western governments 
and the Bretton Woods institutions6. There exist different models and definitions of 
democracies, as democracies have varied in different times and different places. 
Several scholars, notably Ake (1991), have introduced the idea of ‘social 
democracy’ (also called the ‘Scandinavian model’) which, according to Cawthra, 
Pisani & Omari (2007: 7), “demands material betterment, equality, social justice, 
the upliftment of citizens, and concrete rights”. Good (2002) on the other hand, 
propagates participatory democracy, as seen in Athens between 508-322 BC. 
The transitions into democracy in the late 1980s, however, produced a broad 
acceptance, throughout much of the Southern African region, of the values and 
norms of liberal democracy, with regular transparent elections, constitutional rule, 
and adherence to human rights. The development discourse at that time seemed 
to “entitle the North to develop and democratize the South in its image” (Muiu, 
2008: 152). 
Development in the modern world is generally equated with modernisation 
connected to economic growth and technological progress. To be developed is 
often identified with the idea of industrialisation and the use of advanced 
technology; to be underdeveloped means the opposite, a lack of industrialisation 
and the prominence of subsistence agriculture over mechanised agriculture. The 
study of political development has undergone extreme changes, and in Abdul 
Rahman’s (2006: 1) words: 
After its heyday in the 1960s and 1970s with the development agenda 
being high on the list and the state playing a developmentalist role, the 
idea of development - together with development studies as its corpus of 
                                            
6 The Bretton Woods institutions consist of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank Group, including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). It 
constitutes an international monetary regime going back to the end of the World War II. 
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knowledge and intellectual soul - came under the ferocious onslaught of 
neoliberal globalisation since the 1980s. The resulting ‘big push’ towards 
liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation in policy and the pervasive 
influence of the neoliberal ideology on scholarship with its thesis of the 
minimalist role and the retreat of the state, has resulted in the 
undermining of the development agenda and in pushing development 
studies into a cul-de-sac. 
For this evolution, Hettne (1990: 9) gives the following explanation: 
During the 1980s, development studies faced external and internal 
challenges. Externally, it was challenged by a fundamentalist, mono-
disciplinary trend in the academic world, and a neoconservative trend in 
politics. Both trends reduce the ‘development problem’ in a highly 
simplistic way, thus neglecting the insights achieved in the field during 
three decades of empirical and theoretical explorations into previously 
unknown territories. To this should be added persistent suspicions in 
Third World academic communities about the relevance of Western 
development research, suspicions that can only be reinforced by the 
trends just mentioned. 
The ‘Washington Consensus7’ has forced the development discourse into a very 
narrow economic growth path, but increasingly, and since the 1980s, it has 
included the goal of ‘improving the standard of living for all people in poor 
countries,’8 and also the term human development, which the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP) (1990) defines as:  
                                            
7 The ‘Washington Consensus’ described a reform package promoted for crisis-ridden  developing 
countries by institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fond (IMF) and the 
United States Treasury Department. According to Rodrik (2006: 973) “"[s]tabilize, privatize, and 
liberalize" became the mantra of a generation of technocrats who cut their teeth in the developing 
world and of the political leaders they counseled”.  
8 Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren, ‘The Challenge of Postconflict Development,’ in Postconflict 
Development: Meeting New Challenges, ed. Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren. Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 2005, 3. 
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A process of enlarging people’s choices. The most critical ones are to 
lead a long and healthy life, to be educated, and to enjoy a decent 
standard of living. Additional choices include political freedom, 
guaranteed human rights and self-respect.  
In order to link the study of political development and transitional justice, this 
broader understanding of development gives way to Duthie’s (2008: 294) 
conclusion that,  
it is unlikely that transitional justice efforts lead directly or in any 
measurable way to macro-level economic growth. [However], a broad 
understanding of development - including its economic, political and 
social elements - allows one to draw links between long-term goals 
that may be shared by the two different types of initiative, including the 
rule of law, respect for human rights, democratization, good 
governance and peace. 
He continues by giving four examples of how transitional justice and development 
can relate to each other. Firstly, he brings up the issue of complementarity, where 
long-term goals can be shared and where rather than restoring the conditions that 
led to the conflict, there should be a mechanism of transformation involved.  
Secondly, development might have an inadvertent affect on transitional justice, as 
poorer countries might struggle to afford justice. This does not, however, 
determine the choice of justice. Thirdly, there are advantages in coordinating 
transitional justice and development efforts in order to create synergies. Duthie 
(2008: 301) gives examples of reparations, memorials and restitution programmes 
(originally transitional justice tools) that all might work hand-in-hand with 
development programmes. Finally, both efforts might intentionally address or 
engage each other “including the violation of economic and social rights, as well 
as the root causes of conflict and the structural and distributional inequalities that 
may have facilitated civil and political abuses, related to such issues as conflict 
resources, land, corruption, civil society, education and health” (ibid.). This has 
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been addressed in different truth commissions such as the ones in South Africa, 
Sierra Leone, Peru, Liberia and East Timor. 
2 . 3   K e y  t e r m s  –  c o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n  
This study revolves around two key terms that are embedded in the mandate of 
the South African TRC. It is the promise of never again, which can academically 
be transcribed into the notion of sustainable peace. In the following section we will 
look at the concept of never again and give a survey of its origins and how it found 
its way into transitional justice, peace research and political development. The 
second key term that this study will engage with is ‘sustainable peace’. It will 
explore what sustainable peace is and how it is used in the field of transitional 
justice, and the relationship between these two concepts. 
2 . 3 . 1  N e v e r  a g a i n  -  a n  a t t e m p t  a t  a  g e n e a l o g y  
One of the key terms of this study is the slogan never again. This phrase has 
prominently made its way into the truth commissions’ language and into the field of 
transitional justice through the decision of the Argentina Commission of Historical 
Clarification to call their final report of their truth commission ‘Nunca mas’ – or 
‘Never Again’. However, an earlier precedent can be traced to the UN and its 1948 
Convention which was the first truly universal, codified statement on genocide, and 
enshrined within it was the promise of never again. Never again has been 
dismissed by some scholars as a hollow slogan, and praised by others as the 
ultimate way of reminding coming generations of historical atrocities. However, 
there have been repeated attempts to show that there is a need to go ‘beyond the 
never agains’9 in order to promote sustainable peace further and more efficiently.  
It has been difficult to assess where the expression never again actually derives 
from10. There seems to be a certain consensus that the origin lies in the 
                                            
9 The Stockholm International Forum Conferences (2000-2004) which culminated with the 
publication “Beyond the never agains” published by the Swedish Government in 2006. 
10 This study will not give an unpacking of the semantic inclination of never again, as this goes 
beyond its task. However, it highly recommends further research in this area.  
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afterthoughts of the Holocaust at the end of World War II, manifested in the 
Dachau Concentration Camp Memorial Site of ‘Nie wieder Dachau’ – ‘never again 
Dachau’ (Edkins, 2001). This assumption seems insufficient as we can trace it as 
far back as to “the biblical imperative of memory, Zakhor11, derived from the crucial 
order in Deuteronomy12 5:15: ‘And remember that thou wast a servant in the land 
of Egypt, and that the Lord thy God brought thee out thence through a mighty 
hand and by a stretched out arm’ (Kellner, 1994: 128)”. This directive to 
commemorate the past as a notion of ‘again and again’, symbolised in the 
repetition of the Sabbath, creates the tension between historical remembrance (a 
repetition by definition) and the historical representation of the Holocaust in terms 
of never again (a repetition by urgency).  
Never again becomes thus a militant slogan that engages in a certain pattern of 
revenge, “ready to head off any new Holocaust with arms if needed” (Aronson, 
1980: 64). However, this slogan becomes naive in light of the genocides that have 
occurred both after and before the Holocaust. Aronson (ibid.: 65) explains, 
It becomes clear that optimism is an illusion [and that] none of us can 
wake up innocently any more to a pristine world, react childlike to the 
singing of birds, blue skies, or the promise of happiness. Whatever its 
source, these centuries, especially the twentieth, have demonstrated a 
deep-seated human capacity for radical evil whatever the social system, 
whatever the technological level. This is the meaning of Adorno’s remark 
that poetry is impossible after Auschwitz13. 
Simultaneously it also positions the Holocaust into something unique, something 
that marks the end of naivety; one can say it transforms the Holocaust into the 
                                            
11 The Torah refers to two requirements concerning the Sabbath, i.e. to “keep it” (shamor) and to 
“remember it” (zakhor). 
12 The Deuteronomy is the fifth book of the Hebrew Bible and the fifth of five books of the Jewish 
Torah/Pentateuch. 
13 Adorno wrote in 1949 “To write a poem after Auschwitz is barbaric”, published in “An Essay on 
Cultural Criticism and Society,” in Prisms, p. 34. 
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cradle of horror. Consequently, it blurs the fact that there have occurred mass 
atrocities before the Holocaust. This assumption forms the backdrop of the 
Historikerstreit, where the uniqueness and the moral meaning of the Holocaust 
was bitterly debated. The debate was initiated by Jürgen Habermas, who in 1986 
published ‘Eine Art Schadensabwicklung: Die apologetischen Tendenzen in der 
deutschen Zeitgeschichtsschreibung’ where he criticised several German 
historians, among others Andreas Hillgruber, Ernst Nolte and Michael Stürmer, for 
being apologetic about the German past. The debate brought to light difficult 
questions about whose identity should be studied, through which methods and for 
which purposes.  
The debate gave rise to a wider debate about the political use of history, how both 
poles of the political spectrum seek to instrumentalise historical consciousness to 
support very different models of identity in the present. Hillgruber (1987, pp. 66-67) 
would bring forward that the Holocaust did not differ significantly from other 
genocides, and even had common origins to other genocides. This statement in 
itself did not trouble Habermas – and it is also found in Hanna Arendt’s (1948) 
thesis on the imperialism of racism as a ‘greenhouse’ of totalitarianism. What 
troubles Habermas is the political consequences that come with this statement 
and how through this revisionism, Hillgruber seeks to nullify Germany’s 
responsibility for its own past.  
A continuation of the Historikerstreit can currently be found in literature that seeks 
to engage in connecting the Holocaust with colonialism, as for example the article 
by Gerwarth and Malinowski ‘Der Holocaust als ‘kolonialer Genozid’?’ which 
discusses the similarities between European colonialism and German National 
Socialism, and the question of whether there was a direct continuity between 
‘Windhoek and Auschwitz’. 
The slogan never again – with its use in ‘Never again Dachau, Auschwitz, 
Buchenwald’, ‘Never again Holocaust’, ‘Never again war’, has thus become closely 
linked to political power struggles in the different camps of history-writing which 
gives an important theoretical reminder to everybody who studies this area, but 
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particularly the field of transitional justice that “theory is always for someone and 
for some purpose” (Cox, 1981: 128).  
Thus, the urge for the never again in the final report of the South African TRC 
becomes problematic. It either writes itself into the apologetic tendency of and an 
uncritical praxis within history writing, or it can be critizised for consciously 
instrumentalising historical consciousness to support a certain political 
development in the present. In the case of the the TRC, the Commission has been 
criticised for being biased (Jeffrey, 1999: 101). The TRC has also being criticised 
for promising too much and by this failing to achieve their promised goals 
(Simpson, 2002). For further discussion of this issue, see chapter four. 
2 . 3 . 2 .   S u s t a i n a b l e  P e a c e  
In “Peace by Peaceful Means”, Galtung (1996) focuses solely on peace, leaving 
sustainability to be merely a time factor, rather than a variable that needs specific 
consideration. Since then there has been a shift in attitude towards sustainability, 
since it is in the interest of all actors involved to sustain peace and it is no longer 
divided from the time factor. Galtung’s distinction between negative and positive 
peace, which derives from an article in 1969, has received increasing recognition. 
According to Galtung (1996: 9), there are two compatible definitions of peace: 
“Peace is the absence/reduction of violence of all kinds” and “Peace is nonviolent 
and creative conflict transformation.” Both follow the assumptions that “[p]eace 
work is work to reduce violence by peaceful means” and “[p]eace studies is the 
study of the conditions of peace work” (ibid.). This study argues that Galtung’s 
structural or positive peace leans in its foundation towards sustainability.  
Lederach (1997: 75) suggests “sustainability indicates a concern not only to initiate 
[a change from one status to another] but also to create a proactive process that is 
capable of regenerating itself over time – a spiral of peace and development 
instead of a spiral of violence and destruction.” There is, in other words more to 
sustainability than the time factor, overcoming short-term crisis response and 
leading to long-term structural transformation. To quote Lederach (ibid.) again, “… 
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the key lies in the relationship of the involved parties, with all that term 
encompasses at the psycho-logical, spiritual, social, economic, political, and 
military levels.” Lederach propagates long-term peace through the peace building 
of local people and their cultures. Therefore he finds a need for “practical 
mechanisms by which our vision of a desired future can be used to define our 
response to the crisis; otherwise, the crisis and its dynamics will define the future” 
(Lederach, ibid.: 79). In his chapter on resources, Lederach is very clear about 
making it understood for the donor community that the primary goal is “to find 
ways to support, implement, and sustain the building of an infrastructure for peace 
over the long term” (Lederach, ibid.: 87). This “vision of a desired future” 
(Lederach, ibid.: 79) and the question about the role of the donor community is 
exactly where the study of political development contributes to peace research, 
where it changes the singular use of vision into the plural use of the term, and 
simultaneously and critically discusses the role of the donor community – as is 
done beyond others such as Hanlon (2004) and Andersen (2000). 
The challenge is to find out how the success of sustainable peace can be grasped 
theoretically. Pankhurst (1999: 244) states “[t]here is no established normative or 
deductive theory of the chances of success of post-conflict justice and 
reconciliation.” There is not quite an agreement on what ‘success’ actually means. 
However, in this study, success of post-conflict justice and reconciliation does 
manifest itself as ‘sustainable peace’. Pankhurst (ibid.) proposes that post-conflict 
situations are located between the following scenarios:  
1. A minimal peace settlement with no addressing of social justice; 
minimal rule of law and personal security; no allocation of blame for 
war crimes and complete impunity; ‘low intensity’ democracy and 
fragile protection of human rights. 
2. A complex peace accord with international support and local political 
agreement for longer-term provision of: processes of truth revelation, 
prosecution, amnesty and reconciliation; rule of law; ensuring 
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absolute standards of human rights; facilitating widespread 
participation in associational life and democratic political structures. 
However, Pankhurst’s two point scenario has been argued against, since it is 
exactly the international community that has been accused of supporting ‘low 
intensity’ democracy or “democratic minimalism” as used by Ostheimer (2001). 
According to Samuels (2005: 728), in order to build sustainable peace three 
interrelated transformations are required:  
(a) transformation of the society from one that resorts to violence to 
one that resorts to political means to resolve conflict, requiring that the 
elites negotiate and that there should be widespread social dialogue 
and reconciliation; (b) reform of the governance framework to seek to 
ensure both that a negotiated governance arrangement between 
parties prevents future conflict and the adoption of basic democratic 
governance; and (c) the creation of meaningful institutions that will be 
sustainable after the mission leaves. These institutions cannot be 
imposed from outside, but must be bodies that are able to perform their 
core function and are committed to doing so. 
However, Samuels’ and Pankhurst’s angles are linked to peacebuilding missions; 
that is why the focus of their work is on the ‘mission’ and on ‘international support’. 
In other words, their starting point is a force coming from the outside, instigating 
reform. However, they agree with Lederach in that institutions and structures 
cannot be imposed from the outside.  
Sustainable peace is thus left to each scholars own definition – even though there 
are certain common premises. This study incorporates Galtung’s structural 
positive peace supported by Lederach and reminded by Pankhurst that there is a 
lack of theory when it comes to the question of sustainability in the field of peace 
studies. 
When it comes to sustainable peace and political development, the two issues 
have been closely linked. In the criticism of the TRC it has been frequently pointed 
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out that the lack of political will to implement the recommendations brought about 
by the final report of the TRC is one of the major setbacks to achieve sustainable 
peace (Teitel, 1997; Stanley, 2001).   
2 . 4  C o n c l u s i o n  
Transitional justice manifests itself as a broad field with possibility to find local 
solutions to complex and complicated problems. However, it also reveals itself as 
dominated by politically-motivated discourses, be they historical or 
contemporaneous questions that surround transitional justice; there can 
additionally be found an influence of theories within peace studies. Its link to the 
discussion of democracy should not be underrated, and has been openly 
criticised. It seems that the broader field of transitional justice has uncritically 
adopted the connection between democracy and development as earlier 
propagated by academics within development studies. Thus, as has been shown, 
development studies are in a crisis and have openly reconsidered the democracy-
development nexus that lies at the foundation of the field. 
There seems to be a trend towards an analytical-descriptive approach to the study 
of the transitional justice-peace-development relationship, which is contrasted to a 
normative approach. However, a constructivist tendency can be found – highly 
embedded in the middle ground position of constructivism – which keeps the 
normative approach alive, and which is hereby suggested to be combined into one 
theory rather than separated into different approaches.  
For the remainder of this study, the findings of the section 2.3.1. on the origins of 
the slogan never again and 2.3.2. on the issue of sustainable peace will be 
important since the study focuses in the next chapter on the South African TRC 
and its origins. These two sections have shown that the slogan never again cannot 
be as easily applied to the South African setting as it has been done uncritically in 
the Argentinean case, for example. This chapter has also shown that sustainable 
peace needs some further definition, and this will be discussed by focusing 
primarily on the never again and the sustainability of peace efforts undertaken by 
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the South African TRC, which will be discussed in chapter 4. Sustainable peace is 
here understood as closely linked to Galtung’s and Lederach’s idea of structural 
peace, which means that sustainable peace, is more than the absence of war 
(Galtung’s negative peace). The goal is to find ways to encourage, implement, and 
continue the building of an infrastructure for peace over the long term, through 
structural transformation embedded in local solutions through local peoples and 
their cultures. 
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Chapter Three: Background of South Africa’s TRC 
  
3 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
This chapter will provide background information on the South African TRC. It will 
first introduce historical events that are important in order to understand the 
climate in which the TRC was established. By this it will briefly touch upon the 
history of segregation and how it developed into the Apartheid state with the two 
stages of Apartheid, first 1948, then 1960. It will then introduce the most important 
players who were involved in the turn from segregation to resistance. Thereafter it 
will provide an overview of the context of negotiated settlement, in which the TRC 
is located. This will then lead to looking specifically at the South African TRC and 
its wider role in the negotiated settlement. This information comprises the historical 
background of the TRC, which is an important starting point for the rest of this 
thesis, since many of the conclusions drawn during this analysis will involve 
references to the historical deprivation of human rights as put forward in this 
chapter.  
From establishing a picture of the historical context of South Africa, the study 
focuses on the wider role of truth commissions within historical transitions in 
general, by focusing on the South African TRC, giving its background, explaining 
its mandate and operationalisation, its outcome as well as its recommendations. It 
is necessary to give this background of the TRC, as chapter four will give an 
analysis of how the TRC established whether it achieved sustainable peace. 
Finally, to prepare for the subsequent chapter, this chapter provides the reader 
with some of the relevant shortcomings of the TRC. 
3 . 1 . 1  S h o r t  h i s t o r y  o f  S e g r e g a t i o n  
In 1700, a largely economically independent African peasantry remained 
organised within their own social and political systems, while British and Dutch 
colonial rule established commercial and agricultural centres in the coastal 
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regions. Through the discovery of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886 (Marais, 
2001: 8), this independence was destroyed, as the farmers were needed as cheap 
labor for the mines and for the emerging capitalist agriculture. According to Marais 
(ibid.), it is here the definite origins of South Africa’s status as a ‘Two Nation’ 
society occurred. 
The rise of an urban African population gave hope that a multiracial educated elite 
could challenge the system. In January 1912 the South African Native National 
Congress (SANNC) was formed, which a decade later would change its name to 
the African National Congress (ANC). National in its effort, it was “dedicated to 
overcoming inter-African ethnic divisions and to extending citizenship and 
franchise rights to all South Africans on a non-racial basis” (Dubow, 2000: 3). The 
1913 Natives Land Act was the first major challenge to the newly founded party; it 
prohibited Africans from buying land outside their native reserves, which was only 
7,3 percent of the South African land area (Marais, 2001: 9). The SANNC reacted 
by sending two delegations to England in 1914 and 1919 to emphasise the “loyalty 
displayed by blacks to the British cause during the South African and the First 
World Wars, and remind the King of his obligations to uphold colour-blind 
principles throughout the Empire” (Dubow, 2000: 6). Even though the SANNC was 
not successful in defeating the Land and Union Acts, in fact it was later on 
accused of being “overly deferential, naïve, and elitist” (ibid.), it positioned itself 
successfully as a liberal-minded and centrist organisation, and was to play a 
significant role in the history of South Africa. 
During industrialisation, two different developments can be observed: Many 
Africans were urbanised – this group was basically comprised of black African 
men – and simultaneously they were racially divided both in labour and skills. The 
second development was that many Africans were barricaded by law into ‘native 
reserves’. 
By 1939 the African proletariat had grown to reach 800 000 and workers had 
become increasingly combative and organised into workers unions (Marais, 2001: 
11). The government responded by giving white workers a bigger stake in the 
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system14 and the privileges it offered, and by these actions hardened the ‘Two 
Nation’ society. Alex Hepple (1966) states: 
It was a struggle of white men, striving for a higher standard of life and 
inbred with a fiery belief in their cause which carried them into bloody 
strikes, violence and rebellion. Their main enemy was the Chamber of 
Mines, a body of men who owned the rich gold mines. The quarrel 
revolved around the Chamber`s low-wage policy. This conflict greatly 
influenced the pattern and direction of trade unionism in South Africa. It 
introduced the race factor into labour economics and steered white 
workers into support of an industrial colour bar, with all its damaging 
effects on workers` solidarity. 
Strong economic growth after 1933 enhanced industrialisation; however, the 
decision to take South Africa into World War II in 1939 had severe consequences 
for the population: living costs went up and the government reacted to workers 
strikes with extreme repression. Marais (2001: 13) points out that state repression 
had a crushing effect on the resistance on both black and white trade unions. The 
number of union members went down dramatically, and by 1935 the ANC was 
‘literally dead’15.  
3 . 1 . 2  F r o m  S e g r e g a t i o n  t o  A p a r t h e i d  S t a t e  
South Africa’s ‘Two Nations’ further hardened after the surprising victory of the 
white supremacist National Party (NP) in the 1948 election. The NP’s ‘Apartheid’ 
system16 enforced structures already commenced by colonialism and the 
emergence of capitalism (Marais, 2001: 16). Apartheid is an Afrikaans word 
                                            
14 The Pact Government (1924-1934) imposed a restriction on the electoral power of non-Whites 
and kept the white voters happy which earned them a re-election in 1929. 
15 Stated by J.B. Marks, a prominent member of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA). 
Throughout the 1920s the CPSA focused on organising African workers around issues of trade 
union rights and national liberation demands, and by 1925 the party had a majority of Black 
members and in 1928, the CPSA called for Black majority rule. It was also during this period that 
the CPSA and the African National Congress (ANC) began a close working relationship.  
16 Racial discrimination was institutionalized through the enactment of apartheid laws in 1948. 
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meaning ‘separateness’, where a legal system classified South Africans into racial 
groups – White, Black, Indian, Chinese and Coloured, among other categories, 
with Apartheid laws regulating segregation in literally all areas of life. A welfare 
state was built up for the white elite, while the exploitation of cheap African labour 
increased. It has to be mentioned that alongside Apartheid, the ‘homelands’ 
system was built on and safeguarded by a black elite. Composed mainly of local 
chiefs and administrators, and a minute bourgeoisie consisting of local 
businessmen and civil servants, this elite benefited from Apartheid policies. Local 
chiefs to govern the ‘homelands’ were often directly put in place by the 
government and usually not accountable to the community. This system, 
described as 'decentralised despotism' (Mamdani as quoted in Thornton, 1996) 
created a minority of people who had a stake in the upholding of Apartheid and, 
hence, could act as a bulwark against radicalism and progressive political 
movements. This constellation – a small administrative and political elite coupled 
with a small economic elite – enabled the apartheid government to control the 
'homelands' without having to intervene directly. The homeland policy created 
divided communities and nepotism, and was able to contain political resistance to 
a certain degree. 
Parallel to the homeland policy, the NP regime enhanced capitalism through the 
change from a labour tenant system to a contract labour system. Millions of 
Africans were forcibly removed from white-owned farms and from the urban areas 
declared ‘white’. Additionally the pass law system was expanded and tightened 
(Marais, 2001: 20). Organisations that would support the African majority (like 
trade unions and the CPSA) came under repeated attack. 
The ANC Youth League (ANCYL) was formed in 1949 with strong resistance 
fighters like Nelson Mandela, Oliver Thambo, Walter Sisulu and Joe Matthews. 
Though with radical ideas, they all were ascending from the African middle class. 
The South African Communist Party (SACP) criticised the ANC for its roots in the 
black bourgeoisie. The South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) was 
launched in 1955, and the number of strikes increased. The ANCYL campaigned 
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for a Freedom Charter of 195817, which was supported by the ANC, the South 
African Indian Congress, the South African Coloured People’s Congress, the 
South African Congress of Democrats and SACTU. The Freedom Charter 
presented a democratic alternative to Apartheid. 
The Apartheid system functioned through a severe penalty system, which included 
prohibition of political protests, even non-violent protests. Thousands of citizens 
were tortured, died in custody, sentenced to death, banished or imprisoned for life. 
The South African Communist Party (SACP) was banned and worked 
underground and in exile from the 1950s. 
3 . 1 . 3  ‘ H i g h  A p a r t h e i d ’  a n d  R e s i s t a n c e  
Apartheid’s second phase in the 1960s was characterised by the move away from 
the segregationist doctrine and towards a more dangerous policy which Butler 
(2004: 19) calls “separate development”. The NP’s move towards ethnic 
segregation was a reaction to the decolonisation movements elsewhere in Africa 
(ibid.) and led to the creation of 10 Bantustans and a re-tribalisation of the 
bureaucratic elites of the Bantustans. Ultimately, between 1960 and 1970, the 
population of the Bantustans grew by almost a million, whilst the African 
population in White urban areas fell by over 200 000 (ibid: 22). While African 
political rights were confined to customary rule in the Bantustans, the NP 
elaborated the centralisation of state power under the pretence of white, 
‘democratic’ elections.  
The Pan African Congress (PAC) was formed in April 1959 as a politically 
experienced and strong splinter group from the ANC, and announced the start of 
its anti-pass campaign on 21 March, 1960, a week before ANC’s planned 
demonstration. The gathering ended up with thousands of protesters gathering at 
the Sharpeville police station, and the police opening fire on the unarmed 
protesters, killing 69 and wounding more than 180 people. “Most people were shot 
in the back”, writes Dubow (2000: 62). The Sharpeville massacre intensified the 
                                            
17 See Appendix 1 
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unrest and the anti-pass campaigns in other parts of the country. However, the 
police crushed the resistance, and by 8 April 1960, both the PAC and the ANC 
were banned (ibid: 63) and went into exile or worked underground. These factors 
led to the ANC’s decision to turn to armed struggle in 1961 and launch Umkhonto 
we Sizwe (MK), while the PAC embarked on their armed wing, known as Poqo, 
which means ‘Standing Alone’ or ‘Pure’ (ibid: 66). 
The hardships, racial segregation and struggle continued until the early 1990s. In 
the 1980s there was a shift in the resistance movements, which Marais describes 
as a development from resistance to ‘revolution’. The establishment of the United 
Democratic Front (UDF) helped to overcome the vast multiplicity of organisations 
in favour of a broad popular front. The years before negotiations started were 
characterised by Marais (2001: 62) as “perhaps the heyday of South African civil 
society. [...] a flowering of autonomous activities, linked laterally and not 
subjugated to hierarchical ideological and strategic conformity.” Marais (ibid.: 63) 
states further: 
Fighting escalated between rival factions (sometimes even within 
organizations) as resistance became increasingly violent, disorganized 
and alienated. The ‘comtsotsi’ phenomenon (lumpen township elements 
combining politics with crime), the use of young gangsters as political 
shock troops, the remorseless and sometimes violent intolerance shown 
towards dissent and heterodoxy within the popular movement combined 
with the brutal methods used by the security apparatus to exploit these 
dynamics and sap resistance of direction and discipline. 
It has to be noted that between the release of Mandela in February 1990 and April 
1994, when South Africa effected its first free election, 14 800 people were killed 
(Marais, 2001). 
3 . 1 . 4  N e g o t i a t e d  S e t t l e m e n t  
The ANC had managed to achieve hegemony among the popular masses, and led 
the transition talks with the National Party (NP). The ‘revolution’ never really 
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happened (Marais, 2001) because of a dysfunction of the movement combined 
with the fact that MK never was a real threat to white rule (Marais, 2001). The 
political climate was marked by a “global and local recession, a crisis of order in 
the country typified by extensive political violence, declining confidence of foreign 
and South African investors alike, expressed as lack of fixed investment and 
actual capital outflows” (Allen, 2006: 46). The ANC was powerful enough to 
threaten with continued financial sanctions unless negotiation moved forward, and 
elections were held18. The ANC was also able to show that they had won the 
support of foreign economic partners through the ‘Convention for A Democratic 
South Africa’ (CODESA) talks19. From 1989, the two players were in a stalemate, 
with both the NP and the ANC pushing for negotiations.  
Another factor came in the period leading up to negotiation, as the power struggle 
within the NP was shifted when Botha suffered a mild stroke in 1989, leaving the 
scene to de Klerk, who would move to the political centre and towards 
negotiations. As remarked in de Klerk’s famous speech of February 2, 1990: 
“Serious reforms were set in train, among them the unbanning of the ANC, the 
release of Mandela, and the appearance of cooperation with the UN and other 
international bodies to facilitate a transitional process in the country” (Allen, ibid.: 
55). This paved the way for a short-lived Government of National Unity (GNU) 
consisting of the ANC, NP and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which stayed 
dependent on many of the former regime’s civil service institutions and personnel. 
On May 8, 1996, the final Constitution was adopted by the National Assembly, and 
a day later de Klerk and his National Party withdrew from the GNU, with effect 
from June 30, 1996.  
                                            
18 This threat was weakened but not limited through such scandals as the Dutch and German non 
compliance in respect of steel imports or the British continued unofficial trade in monetary gold with 
South Africa.  
19 CODESA was established by the end of 1991 as a negotiating forum where all political parties 
could be represented. Several parties including the Conservative Party (CP), Azanian People’s 
Organisation (AZAPO), the PAC and far-right groups decided not to participate. 
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3 . 1 . 5  T h e  T R C  i n  t h e  N e g o t i a t i o n  
Simpson (2002: 225) is very clear about depicting the TRC as a significant victory 
for the country. He states: “Instead of pursuing the convenient, politically expedient 
path of collective amnesia, the opposing parties were able to agree that public 
space should be made available to victims and survivors, and to the country as a 
whole, to look back on the past and recount the horrors of the apartheid system.” 
How did this settlement come about? According to Van der Merwe, Dewhirst & 
Hamber (1999: 56), “the development of the TRC in South Africa was crystallised 
by two specific political events, namely the Motsuenyane Report and the post-
amble to the South African Constitution”. The Motsuenyane Report was an ANC 
commissioned report aiming at investigating human rights abuses within ANC 
detention camps. While accepting the findings of the report, the ANC urged for a 
commission to investigate all abuses. Particularly Kader Asmal, a key ANC 
negotiator during the transition, promoted this stance:  
We must take the past seriously as it holds the key to the future. The 
issues of structural violence, of unjust and inequitable economic social 
arrangements, of balanced development in the future cannot be 
properly dealt with unless there is a conscious understanding of the 
past (Asmal, 1992, as quoted in the TRC vol. 1, chap. 4, 6).  
Decidingly, however, was the finalisation of the Interim Constitution. Here the 
question of amnesty was crucial as the NP was not prepared to sign any 
agreement that did not provide for amnesty. A compromise was reached in order 
to secure the transition to democracy, and it was written into the Interim 
Constitution20 that amnesty would be granted to those who had committed abuses. 
No implementation mechanisms were at that point decided upon. 
                                            
20 National Unity and Reconciliation (Act 200 of 1993) as quoted in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993: 
This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society 
characterized by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the 
recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities 
for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex. The pursuit of national unity, 
the well-being of all South African citizens and peace require reconciliation between the people of 
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Thus the TRC was not a result of a broader grass roots movement, but was a 
product of party-political concerns combined with an international trend in how to 
deal with the past. However, civil society engaged afterwards on the input towards 
the draft legislation of the TRC. Dr. Alex Boraine, the former Director of Justice in 
Transition, who was to become a central facilitator of the discussions around the 
establishment of the TRC, and later on becoming one of the commissioners of the 
TRC, was commissioned to lead the draft of the legislation. The raw materials for 
these drafts were mainly gathered at conferences and workshops held by Justice 
in Transition. However, the NP, military and police representatives declined 
invitations to participate in the workshops. 
The final draft was then approved to be presented to Parliament, which engaged in 
an excessive second round of public input and discussion. At the end the bill was 
passed with ANC, NP, Democratic Party (DP – now called Democratic Alliance, or 
DA) and PAC supporting it, the IFP abstaining, and solely the Volksfront voting 
against it. 
Importantly, as Hayner (2001: 41) points out, “[o]nly later was the amnesty linked 
to a truth-seeking process.” At this point it is important to stress that Asmal’s 
political stance, declaring the importance of a fellow history for the development of 
South Africa, has little support in academia.  
                                                                                                                                    
South Africa and the reconstruction of society. 
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of South Africa to 
transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated gross violations of human rights, the 
transgression of humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and 
revenge. 
These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding but not for 
vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimisation. 
In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted in respect of 
acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and committed in the course of 
the conflicts of the past. To this end, Parliament under this Constitution shall adopt a law 
determining a firm cut-off date, which shall be a date after 8 October 1990 and before 6 December 
1993, and providing for the mechanisms, criteria and procedures, including tribunals, if any, 
through which such amnesty shall be dealt with at any time after the law has been passed. 
With this Constitution and these commitments we, the people of South Africa, open a new chapter 
in the history of our country. 
Nkosi sikelel' iAfrika. God seën Suid-Afrika 
Morena boloka sechaba sa heso. May God bless our country 
Mudzimu fhatutshedza Afrika. Hosi katekisa Afrika 
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3 . 2  M a n d a t e  o f  t h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  T R C  
The mandate of the South African TRC is complex and consists of several pages. 
However, the main emphasis lies on 4 points that are quoted below: 
OBJECTIVES AND FUNCTIONS AS PRESCRIBED IN THE ACT  
The Act identified the following objectives and functions:  
3. (1) The objectives of the Commission shall be to promote national 
unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends 
the conflicts and divisions of the past by 
a) establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature 
and extent of the gross violations of human rights which were 
committed during the period from 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date, 
including the antecedents, circumstances, factors and context of such 
violations, as well as the perspectives of the victims and the motives 
and perspectives of the persons responsible for the commission of the 
violations, by conducting investigations and holding hearings;  
b) facilitating the granting of amnesty to persons who make full 
disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts associated with a 
political objective and comply with the requirements of this Act;  
c) establishing and making known the fate or whereabouts of victims 
and by restoring the human and civil dignity of such victims by granting 
them an opportunity to relate their own accounts of the violations of 
which they are the victims, and by recommending reparation measures 
in respect of them;       
d) compiling a report providing as comprehensive an account as 
possible of the activities and findings of the Commission contemplated 
in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), and which contains recommendations of 
measures to prevent the future violations of human rights (TRC, vol. 1, 
chap. 4, 31). 
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For this study and its aim, it is notable that in paragraph 32 of the same TRC final 
report vol. 1, chap. 4, the authors of the final report put forward the tasks in brief, 
and the prevention of future violations of human rights is mentioned as no. 2:  
a) analysing and describing the “causes, nature and extent” of gross 
violations of human rights that occurred between 1 March 1960 and 10 
May 1994, including the identification of the individuals and 
organisations responsible for such violations;  
b) making recommendations to the President on measures to prevent 
future violations of human rights;  
c) the restoration of the human and civil dignity of victims of gross 
human rights violations through testimony and recommendations to the 
President concerning reparations for victims;  
d) granting amnesty to persons who made full disclosure of relevant 
facts relating to acts associated with a political objective.  
The TRC is asked to work through an inductive (understanding) reasoning, 
meaning that it moves from specific observations of the gross human rights 
observations (establishing micro truths) to a broader generalization of the injustice 
done in order to give recommendations and granting amnesty (establishing macro 
truths). This broader generalization is partially done through the help of just war 
theory. We will come back to all three approaches in chapter 4 of this study.  
3 . 3  O p e r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  T R C  
The South African TRC consisted of 17 commissioners, with Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu as chair. It was inaugurated in December 1995, but hearings and 
investigations did not start before April 1996. The commissioners headed a staff of 
three hundred, a budget of around $18 million each year of its two-and-a-half 
years of existence (from 1995 to 1998) and worked from four large offices around 
the country. According to Hayner (2001: 41), it “dwarfed previous truth 
commissions in its size and reach.”   
 54
The Commission worked in three committees: 1. The Human Rights Violations 
Committee, responsible for collecting statements from victims and witnesses and 
recording the extent of gross human rights violations which occurred from 1 March 
1960 to 10 May 1994; 2. The Amnesty Committee, responsible for processing the 
individual applications for amnesty; 3. The Reparations and Rehabilitation 
Committee, which, as the name indicates, was responsible for the formulation of 
recommendations and the architects behind the reparation programs. 
The Commission decided to host institutional hearings, which included: “the 
media, business, prisons, the faith community, the legal system and the health 
sector. All these sectors had, over the years, come under attack for what was seen 
to by some as their complicity with the apartheid system” (TRC, vol. 4, chap. 1, p. 
6). Additionally it held special hearings on three issues: compulsory military 
service, children and youth and finally women. 
The Commission had to produce a final report, which was released in October 
1998 in the form of a five-volume report – and which is the primary source of this 
thesis. The Amnesty Committee continued its hearings for almost two years after 
the release of the final report. 
Again, it has to be mentioned that choices taken throughout the process of the 
TRC had consequences for the rest of the proceedings. By this operationalisation 
it also entailed every definition that the Truth Commission agreed upon. Part of the 
operationalisation would be how the TRC announced its work and how it got 
victims and perpetrators to testify, including an evaluation of the work done. This, 
however, goes beyond the task of the current study.  
3 . 4  O u t c o m e  o f  t h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  T R C  
22 000 victims of the Apartheid system gave statements to the TRC, whereof 
around ten percent gave testimony in public hearings. The Human Rights Violation 
Committee found that, “…  gross violations of human rights were perpetrated in 
the conflicts of the mandate era. These include: The state and its security, 
intelligence and law-enforcement agencies, the SAP, the SADF and the NIS …” 
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(TRC 1998, vol. 6, chap. 2, paragraph 2 – 6). The Commission endorsed the 
international position that “apartheid was a crime against humanity” (ibid.) with one 
important finding: namely, that “the former state was the major violator” (ibid.).  
Furthermore, three main parties were identified: The state, the ANC and the IFP. 
When it comes to the ANC, the commission concluded the following: 
The commission noted that, of the three main parties to the conflict, 
only the ANC committed itself to observing the tenets of the Geneva 
Protocols and, in the main, conducting the armed struggle in 
accordance with international humanitarian law. … However, the 
Commission drew a distinction between the conduct of a ‘just war’ and 
the question of ‘just means’. The Commission found that, whilst its 
struggle was just, the ANC had, in the course of the conflict, 
contravened the Geneva Protocols and was responsible for the 
commission of gross human rights violations. For this reason the 
Commission held that the ANC and its organs – the National Executive 
Council (NEC), the Secretariat and its armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe 
(MK) – had, in the course of their political activities and in the conduct 
of the armed struggle, committed gross human rights violations for 
which they are morally and politically accountable” (TRC, 1998, vol. 6, 
chap. 3, section 3 and 4). 
Here the Commission takes into use the just war theory which will be explicitly 
dealt with in chapter four of this thesis. At this point it is important to observe that 
the ANC was made accountable for gross human rights violations specifically 
because of the Commission’s traditional use of this specific theory. This has major 
consequences for the outcome of the TRC since it practices the approach of 
shared guilt. 
Concerning the IFP, the Commission stated the following: 
The IFP was responsible for the commission of gross violations of 
human rights in the former Transvaal, Natal and KwaZulu, against 
persons who were perceived to be leaders, members or supporters of 
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the UDF, the ANC or its alliance partners. Such violations formed part 
of a systematic pattern of abuse which entailed deliberate planning on 
the part of the organization (TRC, 1998, vol. 6, chap. 5, p. 673, 
paragraph 1). 
The IFP was included in the list of perpetrators, which by now contained most parts 
of the South African political society. 
Concerning the amnesty process, the Amnesty Committee had legal powers of 
enforcement, which meant that  
the applicant was released from all criminal and civil liability arising 
from the incident, and indemnification that also extended to all 
institutions or persons who incurred vicarious liability for the incident. 
Successful applicants serving prison sentences in respect of an 
incident were, therefore, entitled to immediate release and the 
expunging of any relevant criminal record (TRC, 1998, vol. 6, sec. 1, 
chap. 1, 4).  
Important to mention is that the Amnesty Committee had legally binding power, 
while the Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee only had power to make 
recommendations to the president. There exists ample literature dealing with and 
criticising the South African amnesty process. 
It is impossible here to list all the findings of the Amnesty Committee. Most 
research concludes that it was a major benefit that there was no blanket amnesty, 
and that the amnesty was linked to full disclosure and therefore a conditional 
amnesty. “A total of 7116 individuals applied for amnesty, of which 1167 were 
granted. Of the 7116 applications, 5143 were refused administratively without a 
hearing” (Sarkin, 2008: 94). Sarkin (ibid.: 114) comments that it was surprising that 
so few individuals applied for amnesty, and concludes that:  
[h]ad there been a parallel criminal process to provide backup to the 
TRC’s amnesty process, many more perpetrators would have not 
doubted the political will and ability of the state to pursue them. A 
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dedicated prosecuting unit would have provided a greater incentive to 
those waiting to decide whether to apply for amnesty to do so. 
The lack of will of  perpetrators to come forth, and especially of perpetrators  in the 
rank of senior officials, raises many practical, constitutional, and legal issues, 
especially since the commission had “unprecedented authority to call witnesses 
and alleged perpetrators to testify, and the ability to enter premises to locate 
documents related to its mandate” (Chapman & van der Merwe, 2008: 12).  
It has been mentioned from very different sources that the South African mandate 
was part of a political compromise. This is on the one hand manifested in the 
amnesty proposal, which has been discussed before. On the other hand, the 
political compromise is to be found in the definitions of what is to be seen as 
“gross violations of human rights” and the tendency of individualisation of 
responsibility. Mamdani (2002: 35) puts it as follows: 
The big finding, one that led to a public split in the Commission and 
appeared as a minority view in the Report, was that apartheid was 
indeed “a crime against humanity” [TRC 1: 70-71, 78]. At the same 
time, the Commission acknowledged 20,000+ “victims” of apartheid for 
whom it recommended reparations [TRC vol. 5, chap.2]. Could a 
“crime against humanity” that involved a racial and ethnic cleansing of 
the bulk of its population have only 20,000+ victims? 
This decision of individualising victims has severe consequences for both the 
victims and perpetrators. In this concern, Mamdani (2002: 34) points out that 
through personalising crimes against humanity, the Commission chose to focus 
exclusively on the civil regime, meaning the white so-called democratic Apartheid 
system, and ignored the customary regime, that is the black Bantustans’ 
administration working according to tribal rules, which “disaggregated the native 
population into tribal groups – each to be administered under a separate set of 
laws – in the name of enforcing custom” (ibid.). This choice will later have 
consequences on how to rebuild the legal system in South Africa. Simpson (2002: 
220) questions the possibility for attaining reconciliation and preventing the re-
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emergence of human rights violations, since with this mandate, the TRC’s work 
has been “significantly constrained by a representation of past conflict premised 
on politically defined cleavages, which are construed as neatly separable 
analytically from broader patterns of criminal and community violence in South 
African society.” As Bruce & Kirsten (2009) point out in their report, the legacy of 
apartheid and colonialism continues to be relevant to understanding violence in 
South Africa today. The question is thus whether the work of the TRC participated 
in enforcing a violent South African culture. We will come back to this in chapter 4 
of this study. 
3 . 5  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  o f  t h e  T R C  
One of the objectives of the Commission was to provide for: 
The taking of measures aimed at the granting of reparation to, and the 
rehabilitation and the restoration of the human and civil dignity, of 
victims of violations of human rights. Pursuant thereto, section 4(f) 
states that one of the functions of the Commission shall be to make 
recommendations to the President with regard to the policy which 
should be followed or measures which should be taken with regard to 
the granting of reparation to victims or the taking of other measures 
aimed at rehabilitating and restoring the human and civil dignity of 
victims: measures which should be taken to grant Urgent Interim 
Reparation to victims. … the State President, in consultation with the 
Ministers of Justice and Finance, will establish a President’s Fund. All 
money payable to victims in terms of regulations promulgated by the 
President shall be disbursed from this fund (TRC, vol. 5, chap. 5, pp. 
171-172). 
There is no legal power behind the Committee on Rehabilitations and 
Recommendations (CRR). However, the Committee divided the reparations into 
five sections: 1. Urgent Interim Reparations (UIR), 2. Individual Reparation Grants, 
3. Symbolic Reparations, 4. Community Rehabilitation and 5. Institutional Reform. 
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Overall they recommended that “each of the 22,000 victims registered should 
receive between ZAR 17,000 and ZAR 23,000 with the total budget amounting to 
some ZAR 2.8 billion over six years”, while the UIR was intended to provide 
immediate financial assistance to victims to access services that they needed. 
Those who qualified under this recommendation included “victims or their relatives 
and dependants who have urgent medical, emotional, educational, material and/or 
symbolic needs” (Colvin, 2006: 188). The South African government was 
presented with the recommendations in October 1998. Then in April 2003,  
President Thabo Mbeki stated that “the victims who had testified before the 
Commission were to be given a once off payment of ZAR 30,000 each” in which 
the president focused not on financial gains, but “issues of symbolic reparation 
and community restitution” that would facilitate healing among South Africans 
(Naidu, 2004: 2). However, just over 16,000 recognised victims received this 
amount (Naidu, 2004: 4).  
3 . 6  T h e  A c h i l l e s  H e e l  o f  t h e  T R C  
One of the shortcomings of the TRC is the lack of results in terms of the intended 
consequences of the TRC. If sustainable peace is to be achieved there needs to 
be an active alleviation of the remaining large scale poverty, and improved service 
delivery for all. In other words, there has been little change in the structural 
problems which underlined apartheid. Thus, although negative peace has been 
established in South Africa, positive peace has not. Structural inequalities have not 
been adequately addressed. Unless these structural issues are properly dealt with 
there cannot be sustainable peace, as evidenced in the recent wide-spread 
service-delivery protests, or as Simpson (2002: 247) in his evaluation of the TRC 
concludes: “we will have to go beyond formal political and constitutional change to 
tackle the deep-seated social imbalances that underlie the culture of violence at 
the most fundamental, structural level”. 
This has to be analysed through one distinctive feature, namely that South Africa’s 
political transition was interlinked with globalisation. The ANC’s emerging neo-
liberal economic policies was certainly a deal to legitimise its black economic 
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empowerment and some affirmative action. Ballard, Habib, Valodia & Zuern (2005) 
call this process “a globalization process tinged by colour.” Politically it is 
manifested through the shift from the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RPD), introduced by the ANC in 1994, to the Growth, Employment 
and Redistribution (GEAR) approach introduced during the Mbeki presidency in 
199621. 
This shift is largely due to the context in which large South African companies took 
advantage of the opportunities presented by the global market, and began to 
shape the policy debate in South Africa. Furthermore, the IMF and the World Bank 
started lobbying soon after it became clear that the ANC would form the first post-
apartheid government. These efforts were merged into the neo-liberal economic 
strategy the government adopted in 1996 (Bassett, 2008: 192)22. The latest figures 
from the government’s Development Index of 2009 show that inequality between 
the rich and the poor is increasing, and there is no doubt that the net effect of 
coupling economic globalisation with democratic transition has been devastating. 
“Inequality,” according to Bruce et al. (2009: 8), “and in particular increasing levels 
of inequality in the black community, reinforces the psychological legacy of 
apartheid.” 
                                            
21 In South Africa the economic policy discourse since 1994 has circled around the questions of 
relationship between growth, inequality and economic structure. Specifically two strategies have 
been forwarded: developmental strategies and competitiveness strategies. While the latter seeks to 
improve productivity without guiding investment, the first focuses on restructuring the economy to 
achieve greater equity and employment (Makgetla, 2004). 
22 In 1994, the economy was dominated by six powerful interlocked conglomerates: Anglo-
American, Rand Mines/SA, Mutual, Gencor/Sanlam, Anglo-Vaal, Standard/Liberty Life and 
Rembrandt/Gold Fields. These controlled more than 70 per cent of formal sector economic 
activities. Their core activities were the productive and distributive activities associated with the 
mining and energy sectors and related manufacturing sub-sectors like smelting and mineral 
processing, as well as banks and insurance companies. These companies exerted structural power 
in the economy, with their interests well represented throughout the state. Liberalisation and 
deregulation, coupled with opportunities created by global neo-liberalism, made it possible for 
these corporations to restructure (Makgetla, 2004: 275). In the name of globalisation, they eagerly 
bought mining, natural resource and other companies around the globe, and further expanded their 
banking and commercial interests (Bassett, 2008: 194). South Africans were soon the biggest 
foreign investors in Southern Africa, though little was investment in new businesses. A second 
trend in globalization was the ‘de-nationalization’ of several South African firms in the late 1990s, 
“Anglo American, South African Breweries, Liberty Life and Old Mutual, which moved their head 
offices and primary stock market listings to London” (Bond as quoted in Bassett, 2008: 194). 
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Even though subsidies helped to build 630 000 new homes23, the housing backlog 
has continued to grow (Marais, 2001: 190-191) and the impoverished were 
expected to pay full market costs. Protests in 2004 were met with harsh state 
repression, arrests and bail conditions, which is a reminder of the Apartheid era. 
Government and business leaders were eager to demonise these protests.  At the 
same time, there was a new emphasis on pro-poor spending through a new 
economic policy framework, the Accelerated and Shared Growth South Africa 
(ASGISA) from 200624.  
Another shortcoming of the structural changes in the aftermath of the TRC is the 
increase of violence and crime in South Africa. Johan Burger (2009: 10) at the 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS) concludes in his analysis of the 2008/2009 
South African Crime Statistics that, “Violent crimes … are dangerously close to 
becoming out of control” and that “[w]hatever we are doing to combat these crimes 
is not working.”  
Finally, it is pivotal to mention that the protests against the lack of service delivery 
have sadly been instigating xenophobic attacks. The perceived/lived inequity has 
taken on the face of the immigrant. 
Political development in South Africa is closely linked to the question of racial 
redress and citizenship (Habib et al., 2008). The issue of race and citizenship can 
feed into certain forms of violence, including xenophobia and racially motivated 
hate crime. According to Rauch (2004: 1) the complexity of the issue “must be 
assessed in relation to the country’s apartheid history, as well as the processes of 
reconciliation best captured by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).”  
Rauch (ibid.: 9) further states that  
the degree to which the TRC used race as an explanatory variable in 
its understanding of the abuses it investigated remains questionable. In 
                                            
23 These numbers include both built houses and the transfer of title deeds for small serviced plots 
of land on which people were expected to build their own shacks. 
24 However, critics state that ASGISA is merely GEAR combined with more infrastructure spending 
with reservations concerning accomplished profit. 
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some cases, ‘race’ was generally collapsed into ‘political motive’, as 
exemplified by the amnesty decisions in the Amy Biehl, Chris Hani and 
St James’ Massacre cases. However, this was done inconsistently and 
the relationship between race and politics was not clearly defined. 
Overall, the reconciliation process engaged less with ‘black and white’ 
issues than with inconsistent ‘political’ definitions of perpetrators and 
victims. This has had the after-effect of divorcing race, and racial 
identity, from the violence of the past”. 
By this, as a transitional justice mechanism, the TRC paved way for a certain 
acceptance and legitimation of the violence of the past, which plays a key role in 
how violence is perceived in the present. From a political development point of 
view, violence has been kept separate from understandings of violence during the 
Mandela era (1994-1999), which embraced the idea of national unity and rainbow 
nation. The Mbeki era (1999-2009) on the one hand embraced race through his 
idea of the African Renaissance as exemplified in his “I am an African” speech in 
1996 on the occasion of the passing of the new Constitution in South Africa. On 
the other hand he reinserted an economic dualism as the predominant way of 
understanding South African society. Zuma’s position in this regard is still too early 
for prognosis, but he seems not to differ too much from the position during the 
Mbeki era – combining machinegun-grassroot Africanism with a continuous 
economic dualism. 
3 . 7  C o n c l u s i o n  
This chapter has given background information about the history of segregation in 
South Africa from 1700 until today, with a focus on the Apartheid system, the 
movement from segregation to resistance, the background of the negotiated 
settlement and the importance of the TRC and the provision of amnesty during the 
negotiations. This chapter has outlined the mandate of the TRC, including a short 
discussion of the political inclination of the fact that the mandate was highly 
motivated by the results of the negotiations. It described the operationalisation of 
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the TRC, some of its outcomes with the focus on the three committees formed 
within the TRC, and finally some of its recommendations.  
This chapter finished with an outline of some of the problems that South Africa still 
faces after the TRC, focusing on the issue of poverty and the lack and crisis of 
service delivery; crime and xenophobia. With the lack of structural changes after 
the TRC, poverty and inequality remain in place with new challenges that rise out 
of these structural problems. These problems have their root in the Apartheid 
system and are closely linked to the question of sustainable peace and the never 
agains. 
This background information leads the study further into chapter four, where it will 
provide for an in-depth study of the measures proposed by the TRC to prevent the 
recurrence of abuses of human rights. This will elaborate further on the issues 
presented in this chapter, in the light of sustainable peace and the never agains.   
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Chapter Four:  Sustainable peace and South Africa’s TRC 
  
4 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
This chapter will primarily focus on the analysis of the Final Report of the South 
African TRC, concerning how it deals with its mandate when it comes to the never 
agains, the notion of sustainability of peace and its depiction of institutional and 
structural violence. To do this analysis, it will initially comment on the TRC’s theory 
of choice – namely just war theory – in order to address the Commission’s own 
preference of theoretical background.  
Finally, this study will comment on chosen secondary literature which has 
evaluated the South African TRC. This secondary literature ranges from response 
to the TRC immediately after the presentation of the final report on October 1998, 
to comments on research published ten years later after the release of the report. 
This chapter will lean heavily on a textual analysis as outlined in chapter one.  
4 . 2  J u s t  w a r  t h e o r y  i n  t h e  F i n a l  R e p o r t  
In the Final Report (TRC, vol. 1, chap. 4, p 66, paragraph 64), the TRC claims that  
… the Commission was guided by criteria derived from just war theory 
(which was referred to in several submissions made to the 
Commission by political parties), international human rights principles 
and the democratic values inherent in the South African Constitution. 
By using these criteria, the Commission was able to take clear 
positions on the evils of apartheid, while also evaluating the actions of 
those who opposed it.  
The just war theory can be summarised by the following: “The just war tradition is 
based on the paradox that killing may be necessary to save lives, that the 
devastation of war may be required to prevent the destruction of deeply held 
values” (Williams & Caldwell, 2006: 309). The Commission underwent an analysis 
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of both involved parties according to these criteria. Its findings accepted the 
argument of the NP and Freedom Front (FF) that argued, “many people had 
clearly believed that they were fighting against Communism and anarchy and not, 
in the first place, for apartheid” (TRC, vol. 1, chap. 4, p. 67, paragraph 69). On the 
other hand, concerning the liberation movement, the Commission defined 
apartheid as a crime against humanity, but emphasised that “[this] does not mean 
that all acts carried out in order to destroy apartheid were necessarily legal, moral 
and acceptable. The Commission concurred with the international consensus that 
those who were fighting for a just cause were under an obligation to employ just 
means in the conduct of this fight” (TRC, vol. 1, chap. 4, p. 69, paragraph 74). 
The following quote indicates how the Commission defines the just war theory in 
its Final Report: “Over time, philosophers have divided just war thinking into two 
parts, jus ad bellum and jus in bello – the before and after considerations 
separated by the point of entry into the war” (Williams et al., 2006: 310). With other 
words, the Final Report considers  jus ad bellum – “the moral reasoning that 
justifies the resort to war” (ibid.) and  jus in bello, which concerns the means with 
which the war is waged and what kind of methods are used to carry out the 
conflict. However, as Williams et al. point out, there should be added jus post 
bellum principles, as the outcome of wars are invariably evaluated both in political 
and moral terms. Wars should hence be judged by three separate standards. This 
additional lens of judgement, the jus post bellum, could have turned the table of 
the outcome of the final report and corrected the Commission’s efforts to make 
both sides responsible for violations committed during Apartheid. However, since 
the Commission adopted a very traditional way of looking at the just war theory, 
the Commission adopted “the view that human rights violations could be 
committed by any group or person inside or outside the state: by persons within 
the PAC, the IFP, the South African Police (SAP), the South African Defence 
Force (SADF), the ANC or any other organisation” (TRC, vol. 1, chap. 4, p. 69, 
paragraph 77). It has to be made clear that it was not incorrect of the TRC, 
according to the jus in bello, to hold responsible both those who supported 
Apartheid and those who supported the liberation movements for unjust means 
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during the period of Apartheid rule. However, when looking at the outcome of the 
TRC it is evident that there is an imbalance in the Final Report in terms of which 
groups or individuals carry the majority of responsibility, and this is due largely to 
the lack of consideration of the jus post bellum. Jus post bellum in general 
regulates the ending of wars, and prepares for the transition from war to peace. 
There are some proposed principles. For the first the principle that a peace 
agreement should be proportional and publicly proclaimed. For the second, it 
should ensure that the war had an improving affect. With this follows a rights 
vindication, such as the rights to life and liberty and community entitlements to 
territory and sovereignty. For the third, a distinction should be made between 
leaders, soldiers and civilians; this excludes any sweeping socio-economic 
sanctions. For the fourth and fifth, there is the question of punishment where 
leaders should face fair and public international trials for war crimes. Additionally 
soldiers from all sides of the conflict should be held accountable for committing 
war crimes. Here the transitional justice mechanisms come in to provide with 
either additional tools to trials or alternatives to trials. For the sixth, financial 
restitution should be mandated, allowing all parties of the war to begin their own 
reconstruction. Finally the jus post bellum entertains a rehabilitation process 
including deep structural transformation towards a more just society (The Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy). A just peace should include these ethical 
components in order to achieve a balanced exit from war. Behind these principles 
lies the belief that only through a well accomplished jus post bellum can there be 
sustainable peace. However, these aspects are dependent on a political 
development perspective, since jus post bellum is about a political redress, be it 
the important discussion concerning human rights, democracy, citizenship and 
deep structural transformation. It is important to acknowledge that these issues are 
extremely complex. To take one example: while most perpetrators received their 
amnesty and walked away, victims did not receive justice as easily, as reparations 
were pending (Colvin, 2006). More importantly, the TRC was given power to 
implement amnesty, while it was not given power to implement reparations. The 
TRC could only make recommendations about reparations to the state. In this 
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case the TRC accepted a selective justice mechanism and defended this as 
restorative justice that was supposed to bring about healing and restoration to all 
involved. It has to be added that prosecution since the closing of the TRC has 
been slow. Only four cases concerning human right abuses during Apartheid have 
been pursued and, 
[i]n 2004, the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) placed a 
moratorium on prosecutions of apartheid-era political cases in 
response to political concerns about the consequences of pending 
cases … Indications are that only about 15 cases will be actively 
pursued in the next few years, as the costs of such cases and the 
political sensitivity are considered too high (Chapman et al., 2008: 
285). 
The liberation movement’s Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), to take another example, 
has not been given enough credit for the Motsuenyane Report, a report written 
exclusively to undertake investigations of human rights violations inside MK and 
instigated by the ANC. Had jus post bellum been taken into consideration by the 
Commission, chances are that the TRC and its outcome would be much more 
clear in appointing responsibility to the Apartheid system and consequently its 
prosecution or any other way of punishing the guilty. We can see that trials in the 
aftermath of for example the truth commissions in Argentina and Guatemala have 
been very common and there is a certain political will to prosecute the guilty, while 
there can be observed a lack of political will to prosecute in South Africa (Allen, 
2006; van der Merwe (2008)). 
The consequences of the choice of just war theory is also manifested in the way 
the Commission deals with its specific mandate to give “recommendations of 
measures to prevent the future violations of human rights” (TRC, vol. 1, chap. 4, 
31), because a decision to call for a shared responsibility of the atrocities 
committed would have serious implications for how to prevent future violations. 
Instead of giving the people of South Africa the moral obligation to ensure that 
future atrocities will not take place (view section 4.3), there should have been an 
 68
analysis of how to efficiently prevent future human rights violations, and a 
prioritised list of suggested recommendations should have been provided, with an 
explanation of why they were given and who would be responsible for carrying 
them out. It was never in the interest of the TRC that it did not have enough power 
to make sure that its recommendations were implemented. Neither was it in the 
interest of the TRC that due to lack of clarity in the TRC and its choice of theory, a 
majority of the people who benefited from the Apartheid system never experienced 
repercussions for their acquiescence, nor was any campaign implemented to 
effectively educate the beneficiaries of Apartheid on questions of moral 
responsibility and broader social implications of this. This has clearly had 
implications for the reception of the Final Report, especially on the side of the 
ANC, that initially had threatened not to cooperate with the Commission because 
they argued that they were involved in a just war (TRC, vol. 1, chap. 1, paragraph 
41). 
4 . 3  T h e  n e v e r  a g a i n s  i n  t h e  F i n a l  R e p o r t  
The term never again is used eight times in total within the Final Report, while the 
term “to prevent from”/”the prevention of” is used 53 times. In the mandate it was 
chosen to use “prevent” in preference to never again. However, as the two terms 
are used in a similar manner and not least because of limitations on length, this 
study will focus on the use of the term never again. 
The term is first used in chapter one of the Final Report and is linked to the notion 
of historical accountability, truth finding and a culture of respect for human rights:  
In our case, dealing with the past means knowing what happened. 
Who ordered that this person should be killed? Why did this gross 
violation of human rights take place? We also need to know about the 
past so that we can renew our resolve and commitment that never 
again [researcher’s emphasis] will such violations take place. We need 
to know about the past in order to establish a culture of respect for 
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human rights. It is only by accounting for the past that we can become 
accountable for the future (TRC, vol. 1, chap. 1, p. 7, paragraph 28). 
It is furthermore connected to self-examination; that is, to assign guilt not to others 
but to understand the evil in ourselves, as expressed in the TRC, vol 1, chap. 5, p. 
133, paragraph 108: 
This focus on the outrageous has drawn the nation’s attention away 
from the more commonplace violations. The result is that ordinary 
South Africans do not see themselves as represented by those the 
Commission defines as perpetrators, failing to recognize the ‘little 
perpetrator’ in each one of us. To understand the source of evil is not 
to condone it. It is only by recognizing the potential for evil in each one 
of us that we can take full responsibility for ensuring that such evil will 
never [researcher’s emphasis] be repeated.  
Subsequently the phrase is connected to a moral obligation to carry South Africa 
beyond its Apartheid past and towards a more democratic state, as a nation.  This 
is expressed in the TRC, vol. 1, chap. 5, p. 133, paragraph 109: 
A second reason for the insufficient focus on moral responsibility 
beyond the narrow, direct responsibility of specific perpetrators of 
gross human rights violations was the widespread failure fully to grasp 
the significance of individual victims’ testimony before the Commission. 
Each story of suffering provided a penetrating window into the past, 
thereby contributing to a more complete picture of gross violations of 
human rights in South Africa. The nation must use these stories to 
sharpen its moral conscience and to ensure that, never again 
[researcher’s emphasis], will it gradually atrophy to the point where 
personal responsibility is abdicated. The challenge is to develop public 
awareness, to keep the memories alive, not only of gross violations of 
human rights, but of everyday life under apartheid. Only in this way can 
South Africans ensure that they do not again become complicit in the 
banality that leads, step by step, to the kinds of outrageous deeds that 
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have left many ‘good’ South Africans feeling that they can never be 
expected, even indirectly, to accept responsibility for them. In the 
words of President Nelson Mandela: All of us, as a nation that has 
newly found itself, share in the shame at the capacity of human beings 
of any race or language group to be inhumane to other human beings. 
We should all share in the commitment to a South Africa in which that 
will never happen again [researcher’s emphasis].25  
Later in the Final Report the never again is referred to in writing about the new 
South African Constitution, explaining that it is the new South Africa and its 
government that is responsible to prevent the never again. This is illustrated in the 
TRC, vol. 5, chap. 8, page 309, paragraph 14: 
The rule of law – that principle which ensures that no edict of state may 
overrule the rights of citizens, is now specifically protected in the 
constitution. Even if conditions require the proclamation of a state of 
emergency, no one should be able to be held incommunicado and 
without being charged, or in circumstances where they are vulnerable 
to torture and severe ill treatment. In addition, government should 
never again [researcher’s emphasis] pass legislation indemnifying the 
police or other security forces against prosecution or civil claims for 
illegal actions carried out in support of the state, even under a state 
emergency.  
Where human relations are strained by war, meaningful human rights 
enforcement requires constant vigilance, and an unyielding 
commitment to sanctions – no matter how worthy the cause of which 
one is fighting26  
                                            
25 Nelson Mandela’s speech in the National Assembly, 15 April 1997. 
26 The report of the Motsuenyane Commission of Enquiry into certain allegations of cruelty and 
human rights abuses against ANC prisoners and detainees by African national Congress 
members, August 1993. 
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In TRC, vol. 5, chap. 9, p. 411, paragraph 111 the Commission connects the never 
again to contemporary developments in South Africa. The authors specifically 
mention the high level of violence that can be found in the country: 
One of the things the Commission was mandated to do was to make 
recommendations on ways to ensure that things of this kind never 
again [researcher’s emphasis] happen in South Africa. 
We will be looking to see how we might be able to inculcate, instil in all 
of us in this land, a deep reverence for human life against the prevalent 
cheapness that we see, for instance, in the high level of criminal 
violence that is happening at the present time in our country. We hope 
that as we listen to those who are not statistics but human beings of 
flesh and blood, that you and I will be filled with a new commitment, a 
new resolve that our country will be a country where violations of this 
kind will not happen, that the context will be inhospitable for those who 
seek to treat others as if they were nothing. 
It thereafter mentions institutional reform, including legal, administrative and 
institutional efforts that should secure the never again as outlined in the TRC, vol. 
6, chap. 2, p. 95, paragraph 17: 
Institutional reform included legal, administrative and institutional 
measures designed to prevent the recurrence of abuses of human 
rights. The Commission drew up a fairly substantial set of 
recommendations aimed at the creation and maintenance of a stable 
society – a society that would never again [researcher’s emphasis] 
allow the kind of violations experienced during the Commission’s 
mandate period. These included recommendations relating to judiciary, 
security forces and correctional services as well as other sectors in 
society such as education, business and media. 
The last never again used in the Final Report goes back to a previously mentioned 
argument: namely the call for a “moral and spiritual renaissance” as formulated in 
the TRC, vol. 6, chap. 5, p. 592, paragraph 16: 
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There were those who were responsible for creating and maintaining 
the brutal system of apartheid, those who supported this brutal system 
and benefited from it, and those who benefited from the system simply 
by being born white and enjoying the privileges that flowed from that. 
Others occupied positions of power and status and enjoyed great 
influence in the apartheid system, even though they had no direct 
control over the security establishment and were not directly 
responsible for the commission of gross human rights violations. It is 
only by acknowledging this benefit and accepting this moral 
responsibility that a new South African society can be built. What is 
required is a moral and spiritual renaissance capable of transforming 
moral indifference, denial, paralyzing guilt and unacknowledged shame 
into personal and social responsibility. This acceptance of moral 
responsibility will allow all those who benefited from apartheid – 
including the business community and ordinary South Africans – to 
share in the commitment of ensuring that it never happens again 
[researcher’s emphasis]. 
As is shown above, the Final Report does not give a clear definition of never 
again, neither how this objective should be achieved. The Report does not provide 
any answers concerning which theoretical framework should be used to find ways 
to achieve the objective of never again. A broader and more contextualised 
theoretical perspective on how to achieve an objective such as never again could 
for example easily be linked to the issue of sustainability of peace or to the 
prevention of institutional and structural violence; however, the Commission 
remains unclear about this point. This lack of addressing institutional and structural 
violence in its Final Report has serious consequences, since the Report never 
identifies who has the responsibility to ensure the TRC-defined never again; the 
TRC never decides whether it is the moral obligation of the population of South 
Africa or the obligation of the new government to initiate institutional reform.  The 
TRC never says whether it is the work of this institution itself, through its truth 
finding, that will ensure the never agains and guarantee a sustainable peace in the 
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future. To rather use the term ‘sustainable peace’ than the never again is 
recommended (See chapter two, section 2.3.1 on this issue). The notion of 
sustainable peace will be addressed in the next section.  
4 . 4  T h e  n o t i o n  o f  s u s t a i n a b l e  p e a c e  i n  t h e  F i n a l  R e p o r t  
Only three times is the word “sustainable”/”sustainability” used in the final report.  
It is surprising that the phrase ‘sustainable peace’ in itself never occurs in the Final 
Report. However, as shown in chapter two of this study, sustainable peace is a 
concept that underlies the slogan never again, and it is closely linked to Galtung’s 
notion of positive peace, as shown both in chapter two and in the following section. 
Finally, sustainable peace can indirectly be linked to sustainability and to 
sustainable development – as used in the Final Report.  
The first time the word sustainable is used in the Final Report it is linked to the 
idea of a creation of a home for all South Africans. It is connected to reconciliation, 
to “growth and development of the spirit of ubuntu” that can only be created 
through “structural and institutional transformation” (please find these two quotes 
in the lengthy quotation below) and the promise that the past will not be repeated. 
This is expressed in TRC, vol. 1, chap. 5, pp. 109-110, paragraph 28: 
Many years ago, Albert Luthuli, the first South African recipient of the 
Nobel Peace Prize, articulated a vision of South Africa as “a home for 
all her sons and daughters”. This concept is implicit in the interim 
Constitution. Thus, not only must we lay the foundation for a society in 
which physical needs will be met; we must also create a home for all 
South Africans. The road to reconciliation, therefore, means both 
material reconstruction and the restoration of dignity. It involves the 
redress of gross inequalities and the nurturing of respect for our 
common humanity. It entails sustainable growth and development 
[researcher’s emphasis] of the spirit of ubunto …. It implies wide-
ranging structural and institutional transformation and the healing of 
broken human relationships. It demands guarantees that the past will 
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not be repeated. It requires restitution and the restoration of our 
humanity – as individuals, as communities and as a nation. 
In the TRC, vol. 5, chap. 5, p. 180, paragraph 50, there is a call for collaboration 
with the ministries in charge of strengthening community-based services and 
delivery “In consultation with appropriate ministries, community-based services 
and delivery should be strengthened and expanded to have a lasting and 
sustainable impact on communities [researcher’s emphasis]”. 
Finally, in the TRC, vol. 5, chap. 5, p. 190, paragraph 95, sustainability is 
connected to rehabilitation programmes suggested by the TRC, but where the 
TRC transfers the responsibility to carry through this work to government 
ministries in consultation with other groups such as NGOs, religious communities, 
victim support groups or the business world: 
Rehabilitation programmes should form part of a general initiative to 
transform the way in which services are provided in South Africa. Such 
programmes can also promote reconciliation within communities. The 
following possible rehabilitation programmes have been identified with 
reference to the needs expressed by deponents in their statements. 
For community rehabilitation programmes to have the desired effect 
and to be sustainable [researcher’s emphasis], relevant government 
ministries should facilitate their development, in consultation with other 
partners like representatives of organized businesses, victim support 
groups, NGOs faith communities and so on. 
However, the TRC does not take responsibility for sustainable development, nor 
does it outline who should take responsibility for coming up with a concept of how 
to achieve it (both theoretically and practically). Again it is important to read this 
section in the light of the issue of sustainable peace; it is notable that the leading 
theoreticians of the notion of sustainable peace use sustainability and sustainable 
peace interchangeably, as the following quotation from chapter 2 in this study 
supports: Lederach (1997: 75) suggests “sustainability indicates a concern not 
only to initiate [a change from one status to another] but also to create a proactive 
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process that is capable of regenerating itself over time – a spiral of peace and 
development instead of a spiral of violence and destruction.” There is, in other 
words, more to sustainability than the time factor: overcoming short-term crisis 
response and leading way into long-term structural transformation are equally as 
important.  
When the TRC vaguely delegates the responsibility for sustainable development to 
the newly elected South African government, it does not clarify who has the 
responsibility to follow up these recommendations and how this should be carried 
out. By doing this, the idea of sustainable development/sustainable peace remains 
vague and is never defined nor linked to the concept of never again or the issue of 
institutional or structural violence/positive peace.  
4 . 5  D e p i c t i o n  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a n d  s t r u c t u r a l  v i o l e n c e  
The decision to include a section on institutional or structural violence in the 
analysis of how the TRC should enable sustainable peace derives from two 
different sources. On the one hand, Galtung’s definition of positive peace would 
take into account both structural and cultural forms of violence (see chapter 1 and 
2). On the other hand, the problems with choice of the just war theory made by the 
TRC calls for a different theoretical lens. Through the just war theory, “just peace” 
is linked to the increase of human rights, and the idea of war being waged in order 
to craft peace (Williams et al., 2006: 311). However, the Final Report does not 
clarify what kind of peace they want to craft. This is a challenge for the TRC, which 
the Commission acknowledges. 
In the TRC, vol. 1, chap. 2, page 40, paragraph 68 the Commission clearly shows 
that the Commission links South African political history to institutional and 
structural violence: “Violence has been the single most determining factor in South 
African political history. The reference, however, is not simply to physical or overt 
violence – the violence of the gun – but also to the violence of the law or what is 
often referred to as institutional or structural violence”.  
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Later, in the Final Report, it connected to human rights and the development of 
democracy (in cooperation with other instruments) as is shown in the following 
passage:   
The Commission was conceived as part of the bridge-building process 
designed to help lead the nation away from a deeply divided past to a 
future founded on the recognition of human rights and democracy. Its 
purpose needs to be understood in the context of a number of other 
instruments aimed at the promotion of democracy, such as the Land 
Claims Court, the Constitutional Court and the Human Rights, Gender 
and Youth Commissions, all institutional ‘tools’ in the transformation of 
South African society (TRC, vol. 1, chap. 4, page 48, paragraph 2). 
The Final Report furthermore points towards the new South African Constitution: 
The mandate of the Commission was to focus on what might be 
termed ‘bodily integrity rights’, rights that are enshrined in the new 
South African Constitution and under international law. These include 
the right to life, the right to be free from torture, the right to be free from 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment and the right to 
freedom and security of the person, including freedom from abduction 
and arbitrary and prolonged detention (TRC, vol. 1, chap. 4, page 64, 
paragraph 56). 
However, the Commission admits that what they call “bodily integrity rights” is not 
enough to ensure the rights of a human being:  
But bodily integrity rights are not the only fundamental rights. When a 
person has no food to eat, or when someone is dying because of an 
illness that access to basic health care could have prevented - that is, 
when subsistence rights are violated - rights to political participation 
and freedom of speech become meaningless (TRC, vol. 1, chap. 4, 
page 64, paragraph 57).  
Thus the TRC concludes with the two following paragraphs:   
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Thus, a strong argument can be made that the violations of human 
rights caused by ‘separate development’ – for example, by migrant 
labour, forced removals, Bantustans, Bantu education and so on - had, 
and continue to have, the most negative possible impact on the lives of 
the majority of South Africans. The consequences of these violations 
cannot be measured only in the human lives lost through deaths, 
detentions, dirty tricks and disappearances, but in the human lives 
withered away through enforced poverty and other kinds of deprivation 
(TRC, vol. 1, chap. 4, page 64, paragraph 58) [and] 
[h]ence, the Commission fully recognised that large-scale human rights 
violations were committed through legislation designed to enforce 
apartheid, through security legislation designed to criminalise 
resistance to the state, and through similar legislation passed by 
governments in the homelands. Its task, however, was limited to 
examining those ‘gross violations of human rights’ as defined in the 
Act. This should not be taken to mean, however, that those ‘gross 
violations of human rights’ (killing, torture, abduction and severe ill 
treatment) were the only very serious human rights violations that 
occurred (TRC, vol. 1, chap. 4, page 64, paragraph 59).  
The Final Report hereby makes clear that the examination of structural and 
institutional violence is not in their mandate, even though the Commission admits 
that structural and institutional violence is a very serious human rights violation.  
It is difficult to understand how the Commission can conclude with excluding 
positive peace from its mandate, since it is clearly in the mandate of the TRC to:  
make recommendations to the President with regard to the creation of 
institutions conducive to a stable and fair society and the institutional, 
administrative and legislative measures which should be taken or 
introduced in order to prevent the commission of violations of human 
rights (TRC, vol. 1, chap. 4, p. 57, paragraph 31h).  
However, the TRC Final Report identifies those factors (institutional and cultural 
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factors) that are important for sustainable peace as outside the mandate of the 
TRC. At this point the confusion about the TRC’s definition of what exactly will 
prevent “the commission of violations of human rights” in the future (ibid.) is 
complete, since it is clearly in the mandate of the TRC and by this is a mission 
given to the TRC, to investigate into the prevention of future violations of human 
rights and  to make “recommendations of measures to prevent the future violations 
of human rights” (TRC, vol. 1, chap. 4, 31). Again, it has to be mentioned that the 
lack of a definition of the TRC’s mandate when it comes to “prevent the future 
violations of human rights” (ibid.) is a prevailing flaw of the TRC. Consequently it 
has to be asked what the “very serious human rights violations that occurred” 
(TRC, vol. 1, chap. 4, page 64, paragraph 59) are, that so painfully fall outside of 
the mandate.  
4 . 6  T h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  o f  t h e  F i n a l  R e p o r t  
Although the Commission has rooted its analysis in the just war theory, the choice 
of theory does not seem to carry the theoretical framework necessary in order to  
justify the choices made in the Final Report: namely, to exclude the third 
evaluation of rules guiding war besides the jus ad bellum and jus in bello (the 
before and after considerations separated by the point of entry into the war) – 
which is the evaluation that is made when the outcome of the war is clear and 
moral and political terms are imposed on the jus post bellum situation. As shown 
above, there is a need for definitions and a need to systematically understand the 
idea of what “to prevent the future violations of human rights” (TRC, vol. 1, chap. 
4, 31) means in a broader discussion of the mandate. With this weak theoretical 
framework, it is highly questionable how the Commission will be able to legitimise 
any recommendations; and rather, they choose to put responsibility for sustainable 
peace on fellow South Africans in their belief that “reconciliation is a process vital 
and necessary for enduring peace and stability” (TRC, vol. 5, chap. 8, p. 304, 
Recommendations). Behind the recommendations lurk insufficient theory and 
weak systematic research, which can be exemplified by the use of the word 
“belief”, a term that is taken from a religious approach to peace. The term “belief” 
 79
appears frequently and is used as in the following example: “These are followed 
by a series of recommendations related to specific areas of the public and private 
sectors that the Commission believes [researcher’s emphasis] could assist in the 
consolidation of democracy and the building of a culture of human rights” (TRC, 
vol. 5, chapter 8, p. 305, paragraph 3).  
The Commission admits that “[o]ne of the essential goals of the Commission was 
to ensure that there would be no repetition of the past” (TRC, vol. 5, chap. 8, p. 
308, paragraph 14). The Commission gives one answer to this: that there should 
be developed a strong human rights culture. However, to achieve this, it lists 
numerous issues that the authors ‘believe’ are important prior to establishing the 
strong human rights culture. The Commission mentions the importance  of  making 
the TRC findings available for the public, the recognition and protection of socio-
economic rights, job creation, economic justice through a fund for training, 
empowerment and opportunities for the disadvantaged and dispossessed, a 
wealth tax to strengthen the war against poverty, the need to overcome racism, 
community policing as a measure in the war against crime, a war against 
inefficiency, corruption and maladministration and respect for  the rule of law  in 
order to never again pass legislation indemnifying the police or other security 
forces. This list is a key to good governance. It could have been a very powerful 
tool in an explanation of how to achieve sustainable peace. Unfortunately, no 
explanation is given about how they arrived at this list, which priorities should be 
made and why, by whom and how the list should be implemented. 
The whole section on prevention of gross human rights violations in the future 
occurs merely as a brainstorming list that is easy to acknowledge but forget. 
Something the new government to a certain degree has done, since few of the 
above-mentioned recommendations are in place in South Africa today. This is to a 
certain degree topic for the study of political development in South Africa, the 
continent and global political development.  
The most important issue, however, is the Commission’s realisation that “a strong 
human rights culture” is the answer to sustainable peace, the never agains and the 
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notion of a positive peace. There is no explanation how the Commission has 
reached this conclusion and how, on the contrary, the Commission lacked a 
definition of the notion of a ‘strong human rights culture’. 
4 . 7  E v a l u a t i n g  t h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  T R C  
Other authors have commented that there exists an entire genre of literature about 
the TRC, and that it is not easy to say anything new about the institution and its 
processes and broader context. In this section, this study tries to support its own 
findings by looking at how other authors have commented on the lack of clarity 
when it comes to sustainable peace in the Final Report. 
Stanley’s evaluation of the TRC from 2001 gives a very negative picture of the 
promotion of a peaceful future. She does not go into the Final Report, but 
concludes that the TRC is a hopeful vision which has not been followed up by 
political will. By this she states that: “The lived experiences of those who bore the 
brunt of state brutality has not altered and with groups, such as women and young 
people, feeling excluded from developmental issues, prospects for future stability 
and equality in South Africa are bleak” (Stanley, 2001: p. 538); “Black communities 
remain characterized by poverty, poor housing, limited educational facilities, 
substandard health services and unemployment” (ibid., p. 541). However, Stanley 
blames the judicial and political policies for this and not the TRC in itself, since she 
believes that the Commission established enough challenges for the ‘perpetrators’, 
the beneficiaries and for the structural conditions of Apartheid. Stanley states, with 
other words, that the TRC has done more than enough to contribute to the 
promotion of a peaceful future. Those that can be blamed for endangering a 
peaceful future, according to Stanley, are the juridical institutions and their ability 
and/or lack of ability to transform. This is something that also Teitel (1997) focuses 
on, together with the political policies, namely governmental decisions that 
rightfully sit with the responsibility to follow up the TRC.   
Simpson (2002), on the other hand, claims that rather than the political will, it is the 
primary mandate itself that is too broad and too ambitious, and to evaluate the 
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outcome will therefore always measure it against an ideal. Simpson points out that 
the narrow definition of human rights violations constrains the TRC in its ability to 
understand the Apartheid system in a more complex and less predictable manner. 
By this, “the role of the TRC in building reconciliation and preventing the re-
emergence of human rights violations in post-apartheid South Africa has been 
significantly constrained” (Simpson, 2002: 220). Simpson, however, does not 
criticise the Final Report in itself, since he states that “[t]he TRC was set a near 
impossible task from the outset” (ibid.: 225) and further:  
[c]ertainly, it would be a grave mistake to judge the whole TRC by the obvious 
shortcomings of its final report, which simply cannot hope (and does not 
pretend) to reflect the full complexity of thirty-five years of history. The great 
value of the TRC lay in the process rather than the published end product 
(ibid., 246).  
However, it is difficult to focus on the process – especially the more time passes 
and the process slides more and more into oblivion. Having read the Final Report, 
it seems that the Commission does want to include the full complexity of thirty-five 
years of history, if not even more so, since it also discusses colonialism and 
acknowledges its impact on the Apartheid system. Going back to the Final Report 
is therefore a necessity, as for example Mamdani (2002) has done, to focus on the 
individualisation of violence and the legal aspects in the Final Report, or as 
Nattrass (1999) has done, focusing on the economic beneficiaries of the Apartheid 
and the role of the business sector.  
Another research tested the relationship between truth finding and reconciliation. 
Gibson (2004). By asking the question whether the South African TRC succeeded 
in its objectives, and further “has truth lead to reconciliation” (Gibson, 2004: 131), 
Gibson’s research evaluates systematically the performance of the Truth and 
Reconciliation process. Gibson (ibid.: 134) gives a definition of a ‘reconciled’ South 
African as someone who: 
! Eschews racial stereotyping, treating people respectfully, as individuals, not 
as members of a racial group; 
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! Is tolerant of those with whom he or she disagrees; 
! Subscribes to a set of beliefs about the universal application of human 
rights protections to all South African citizens; 
! Recognizes the legitimacy of South Africa’s political institutions and is 
predisposed to accept and acquiesce to their policy rulings (ibid.) 
Through Gibson’s definition, reconciliation becomes closely linked to rebuilding the 
culture of respect of human rights, which seems to be the overall answer of the 
Commission to the question of how to prevent further human rights violations. 
Gibson’s overall conclusion is, however, that “truth [does not] inevitably lead[s] to 
reconciliation”. By this he gives the goalpost further to future research.   
Chapman et al. (2008) support this study’s findings through their distinction 
between macro-truth goals, including beyond others the establishing of the 
“causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights” (Chapman et 
al., 2008: 274) and micro truths, for example “related to ascertaining whether 
individuals qualified as victims of abuse and so were eligible for reparations” (ibid., 
275). They conclude that it is difficult to conduct both macro-truth and micro-truth 
findings since they require very different methodological approaches. They also 
conclude by criticising the TRC for complicating its findings by not acknowledging 
its own limitations. When it comes to socio-economic issues, Chapman et al. (ibid., 
276) state clearly that the TRC “has failed to build the basis for a broader 
understanding of the need for socioeconomic sacrifices and compromises to 
correct the injustices committed against the majority of the population”. Their  term 
“broader understanding” can clearly be equated with this study’s quest for a more 
coherent analytical approach to the issues discussed. 
4 . 8  C o n c l u s i o n  
The South African TRC promised too much and defined too little and became 
confused by its lack of distinction between micro- and macro-level analysis. Due to 
these constraints, it is difficult to understand the conclusions the Commission 
draws throughout its Final Report and to keep an overview of the consequences of 
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its findings. The fact that a large portion of the general population actually has not 
read the Final Report additionally brings up the question: What does the Final 
Report actually mean to South Africans? Additionally, the fact that twelve years 
after its publication there still is no shorter and more adapted version available for 
the public might indicate that it is a difficult task to summarise the Final Report 
precisely because of its lack of coherence.  
This chapter has shown that neither the never agains, the notion of 
sustainability/sustainable peace, the depiction of institutional and structural 
violence/positive peace, nor the recommendations of the TRC (as a tool for 
sustainable peace building) give a clear picture of how the Commission will avoid 
future gross human rights violations. It remains unclear throughout the Final 
Report what the Commission recommends and how recommendations should be 
implemented in the future political landscape of South Africa. It is in fact timely  to 
ask the question: Is the TRC threatening to become a cold case?, as Carter does 
in Villa-Vicencio & du Toit (eds.) ask in their compilation on Truth & Reconciliation 
in South Africa: 10 years on.     
Concerning this study, it can be concluded that if the Final Report had established 
a more in-depth analysis of its mandate and its choice of theory, it could have 
used Lederach’s suggestion of an integrated and complex peace building process, 
with special emphasis on the continuing maintenance of peace. As a “dynamic 
social construct” (Lederach, 1997: 20) it would have been interesting to implement 
a time aspect in coherent recommendations and to prolong the importance of the 
findings of the TRC as much as possible. By this the TRC could have made an 
even stronger impact on the future development of its country. 
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Chapter Five:  Conclusion 
 
 
5 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
There is an overwhelming amount of literature, books, papers and studies on the 
South African TRC, so much so that it was not possible in the limited time this 
study had at its disposal, to be able to read all of the work dealing with the TRC. 
However, this study has tried to grasp the most important works available. More 
importantly, the researcher took a step away from the huge amount of secondary 
literature and took her time to go back to the primary source. What, indeed, does 
the TRC, through its Final Report, bring across to its readers?  
The research question for this thesis had to be limited, since it is impossible to 
review the entire seven volumes of the Final Report. This study has explored the 
various aspects of achieving sustainable peace in post-conflict societies. An in-
depth study was carried out on the South African TRC concerning its ability to 
achieve sustainable peace. Therefore, this study focused only on one of the 
mandates of the TRC; namely, the section where the commissioners were 
supposed to work towards “compiling a report … which contains recommendations 
of measures to prevent the future violations of human rights” (TRC, vol. 1, chap. 4, 
p. 55, paragraph 31d). A summary of the findings will be presented in the next 
section. 
5 . 2  S u m m a r y  o f  f i n d i n g s  
How does one assess the mandate to make recommendations of “measures to 
prevent the future violations of human rights”? First of all, this study had to present 
a short background of the pertinent issues. Then it was necessary to present an 
outline of the research problem, followed by objectives and relevance of the 
research thesis together with its research design and methods. This is covered by 
chapter one of this thesis which gives a thorough background of how this study 
was conducted and what kind of literature is available in this field. It was clear from 
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the beginning that it would be necessary to establish a theoretical framework that 
would enable this thesis to critically analyse the challenges ahead. Because of the 
fact that the TRC is a mechanism of transitional justice, this study chose to give an 
in-depth picture of the definitions and mechanisms of Transitional Justice, as well 
as its history and theory. In this way the thesis provides an understanding of the 
larger picture of the TRC and how it is used as one of several mechanisms of 
Transitional Justice. With the aim of utilising a useful theoretical framework, this 
study looks at the field of political development and the links to transitional justice 
and the TRC. It is shown that the development discourse has been influential in 
the field of Transitional Justice. Furthermore, the theories and academic tradition 
within the area of peace building, and more precisely the issue of sustainable 
peace, has been crucial to this study. Included in this theoretical framework is also 
a deconstruction of the term and usage of the idea of never again. By linking this 
term, which is used as a slogan throughout the international TRC discourse, to the 
Holocaust and a very specific historical period, this work has provided a concrete 
recommendation not to use the term never again, but rather to incorporate the 
notion of ‘sustainable peace’ or related concepts into the theory and language of 
Transitional Justice.  
Sustainable peace is linked to institutional and structural violence/positive peace 
which makes it necessary to establish an understanding of South Africa’s history –
an understanding that goes much further than the mandate of the TRC that was 
limited to 1960 until 199427. The root causes of the Apartheid system needed to be 
addressed, including the economic, social and cultural inequalities which are a 
result of both the colonial structure and the Apartheid system and its unequal 
distribution that has had severe consequences for South Africa; moreover, the 
land issue, education, health, crime and poverty have been mentioned as a result 
of these inequalities – covered in the third chapter.  
                                            
27 “The Commission was given four major tasks in order to achieve the overall objectives of 
promoting national unity and reconciliation. [Concerning the time frame these were:] analysing and 
describing the “causes, nature and extent” of gross violations of human rights that occurred 
between 1 March 1960 to 10 May 1994, including the identification of the individuals and 
organizations responsible for such violations” (TRC, vol. 1, chap. 4, p. 57, paragraph 32 a.).  
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In looking at the negotiated settlement, the findings of this thesis are clear that the 
TRC and its mandate was driven by political concerns in close relation to an 
international trend in how to deal with post-conflict societies – and how to 
construct transitional mechanisms in order to move towards post-conflict goals. In 
other words: the TRC mandate was part of a negotiated settlement that prioritised 
the issue of amnesty primarily as a political tool to ensure that the negotiations 
between the ANC and the ruling NP would not break down.  
Chapter four finally explores the core of the research problem: What does it imply 
“to ensure that there would be no repetition of the past” (TRC vol. 5, chap. 8, 14)? 
How does the TRC define this part of the mandate, what are its findings and how 
does it phrase its recommendations? This study has come to the conclusion that 
the TRC failed to contribute to a significant analysis of how to prevent the 
repetition of the past. It has failed to come up with definitions of what is meant by 
never agains, by sustainability and by institutional and structural violence. They 
have, in this part of the mandate, failed to utilise a theoretical framework other 
than a traditional reading of the just war theory, which has been shown in this 
study, to have major difficulties in implementing a sustainable peace framework.  
This thesis concludes that the final report was not able to provide for useful 
recommendations to prevent future gross human rights violations. Chapman et al. 
(2008) distinguish between two goals that are difficult to combine in one quest: 
macro- and micro- truth goals. While the prevention of future gross human rights 
violations would be part of an investigation into the causes of the gross violations 
of human rights – which is clearly a macro-truth goal and would contain all the 
issues discussed in connection to structural violence – the micro-truth goals would 
try to give answers on a more individual level: such as who is eligible for 
reparations and amnesty. By not distinguishing enough between the macro- and 
micro- truth goals, and by prioritising the micro-truth goals, it remains unclear how 
the Commission will avoid future gross human rights violations, and even though 
the Commission supplies a list of recommendations and manages to pinpoint who 
should be responsible for the implementation of the recommendations, it still 
continues to be unclear throughout the Final Report how the Commission actually 
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arrived at the list and how it chose its priorities. The overall conclusion is therefore 
that the Final Report lacks a coherent theoretical framework and investigation into 
the macro-truth goals. By this, the TRC has failed to build the basis for an 
understanding and implementation of sustainable peace. 
5 . 3  S u m m a r y  o f  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
There exist different works that have provided an in depth study of different 
aspects of the Final Report: Mamdani (2002) has looked at the problems with the 
definition of gross human rights violations and how this has affected how the TRC 
has dealt with definitions of the victim, the perpetrator and the legal aspects 
connected with it. Mamdani concludes with a criticism of the Final Report that, 
when it comes to the question of guilt, individualised the crimes and gross 
violations dealt with in the TRC. Nattrass (1999) has analysed the role of the 
business sector and the problems with achieving corporate justice if one is to 
follow the Final Report. These critical analyses, which this thesis forms a part of, 
contribute to a broader understanding of the various issues the TRC has dealt 
with. Instead of dismissing the TRC Final Report as a vehicle that has had too little 
time to develop and is described broadly as a hastily written summary, this study – 
along with others – has taken the standpoint that the TRC Final Report deserves a 
critical in-depth analysis. This study chose to use the tool of textual analysis. 
Through this it is possible to improve further knowledge and methods to enhance 
the work of future TRCs – as much as it might provide a re-reading of the Final 
Report and hopefully an incentive to actually work on a shorter version that will be 
more available for a broader audience. 
5 . 4  T h e o r e t i c a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s  
Textual analysis, as a research tool, has proven to be highly effective in 
pinpointing shortcomings concerning the use of definitions, the inadequate 
utilisation of theoretical frameworks and the use of different research mechanisms 
that do not necessarily go well together. This has furthermore pointed out 
problems concerning the micro-level analysis that the Commission of the TRC has 
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chosen as their instrument of analysis. The TRC did not distinguish clearly 
between the levels of analyses and by this has not properly differentiated between 
micro- and macro-truth on the one hand, and just war theory on the other. Macro-
truth reflects a broader understanding of the nature and structure of gross 
violations of human rights, while micro-truths delve into individual cases, individual 
reparations and reconciliation. These approaches should not be combined. It has 
also been shown that the use of just war theory cannot easily be transferred to the 
field of sustainable peace – as expressed in the TRC as the prevention of future 
gross human rights violations. The use of just war theory as it is applied in the 
TRC, prioritises the focus on jus ad bellum and jus in bello which has led to an 
individualisation of responsibility, and has resulted in a focus on micro-truth goals. 
The consequence is that broader issues of structural violence have been 
neglected. Something that would have been an important criteria if the TRC would 
have chosen a less traditional approach to the just war theory, namely the 
implementation of jus post bellum, which in its approach is very close connected to 
both transitional justice, peace research and the study of political development. 
In summary, this study has built up a set of different theories which are useful tools 
of analysis instead of ones used by the TRC. This study suggests that the TRC 
would better achieve its goals by looking at the issue of sustainable peace as 
outlined by Lederach (1997). It also recommends looking at the combination of 
Transitional Justice, research on Sustainable Peace, studies of political 
development and research on institutional and structural violence in the body of 
work by Galtung (1969), among others.  
5 . 5  T h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s  
The limitations of this study have been the time-frame for the study. The most 
salient issue is that this study, instead of looking at the total amount of times the 
issue of prevention of gross human rights violations is mentioned in the Final 
Report, it had to focus on the much less frequently used term never again. Thus, 
valuable information has not been investigated. However, this choice can be 
legitimised since the term never again is used in the same manner, and focusing 
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on the references to prevention would thus have given similar and repeating 
arguments. 
Another limitation is the difficulty in studying how to prevent future gross human 
rights violations. This is often dependent from case to case, from country to 
country, from region to region and from situation to situation. The study of origins 
of violence of conflict has been a major issue for peace researchers for decades 
and following from this, prevention of future violence is all the more problematic. It 
is thus difficult to accuse the TRC and its Final Report of not providing a solution to 
a question that is universally not easy to answer. However, it is exactly this 
limitation that makes it so important to be more precise with the definitions and 
theory behind the investigation into macro-truth goals and the recommendations 
that the Commission brings forth. Only through systematic analysis is it possible to 
reveal some of the mechanisms and possible answers to the question of how to 
prevent future gross human rights violations in South Africa. 
5 . 6  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  
The recommendations have been made clear. Instead of using hollow slogans that 
are attached to specific historical events and discourses, as in the case of the 
never agains, future truth commissions should put more emphasis on establishing 
a theoretical framework that makes it more clear how to prevent future gross 
human rights violations. TRCs should take available research seriously and 
implement these findings into their report and their legitimation and argumentation 
for their choice of theory – and methods of analysis. Commissions should clearly 
distinguish between micro-truth goals and macro-truth goals and include this 
distinction into their theoretical framework. One can argue that the report would 
become more accessible and more transparent for the public as well as more 
coherent for governments and administration that have to deal with the 
recommendations after the Final Report is published. Moreover, the clearer the 
arguments, the easier it will be for governments and institutions to implement the 
suggestions made by commissions. 
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Another recommendation that follows from the above is that a clearer theoretical 
framework will make it easier to summarise the Final Report and publish a shorter 
version that is easy to comprehend and more accessible to a broader public. 
When looking at the South African TRC, the Commission frequently argued that 
the South African public would be the main change-maker in the new South Africa. 
In order to take this notion seriously, a publication should be made available that 
differs from the Final Report in both length (shorter) and intended audience (“all” 
South Africans). 
5 . 7  S u g g e s t i o n s  f o r  f u t u r e  r e s e a r c h  
This study has shown that it is worthwhile to carry out a textual analysis of the 
Final Report. It both has implications for the reading of the Final Report and for a 
discussion of how to follow up the work of the TRC in South Africa today. It 
furthermore gives advice and new directions for other and new TRCs to follow. 
Therefore it is highly suggested that future research should engage in textual 
analysis in the different areas of the Final Report.  
Additional research needs to be carried out concerning the issue of sustainable 
peace and what a TRC mechanism can do to prevent future gross human rights 
violations. As addressed in this thesis, the work on socio-economic issues needs 
to be strengthened (Laplante, 2008; Duthie, 2008) both within the Transitional 
Justice nexus and TRCs specifically. 
In summary, there is an urgent need to investigate into different forms of analysis. 
The most prevailing form of research found within the field of Transitional Justice 
is still analytical descriptive research. Additionally there is a need for studies that 
involve both qualitative and quantitative research. Related to this research it could 
have been relevant, for example, to investigate into the role of the NGOs and to 
question how they have handled the implementation or lack of implementation of 
the TRC recommendations. This is a question for future research.   
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5 . 8  C o n c l u s i o n  
In conclusion, the result of this study provides implications to future TRCs – and 
also to the dichotomy of how the South African TRC has been viewed: critically 
from the inside, while from the outside there has been a tendency towards 
analysing the TRC less critically. This thesis adds to the critical voices that come 
from both the inside and outside. It is, however, important to mention that the 
South African TRC without doubt has had positive implications – concerning truth 
finding, forensic findings and opening up the long and harsh history and legacy of 
Apartheid. 
In order to analyse the chosen research problem, it has been crucial to look at 
achieving sustainable peace in post conflict and transitional societies by focusing 
on an analysis of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  
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